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ABSTRACT
The Persisting Problem of the Ship of Theseus
(February 1980)
Meredith Wilson Michaels, B.A., University of California,
Santa Barbara, College of Creative Studies
M.A.
,
University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.
We ordinarily think that physical objects persist
thi'ough changes in their parts. The ordinary view has been
challenged by some philosophers. In Chapter I, several ar-
guments in support of this challenge are formulated and
shov/n to be defective. The Problem of the Ship of Theseus,
which has served as a focus for discussion of the diffi-
culties inherent in the ordinary viev;, is presented in an
effort to understand the motivation behind the attempts of
some philosophers to provide alternative accounts of per-
sistence .
One such philosopher is John Locke. Chapter II is
a treatment of Locke's theory of persistence. It is argued
that the viev; most commonly attributed to Locke, namely that
identity is relative, is inconsistent with his ontological
V
presuppositions. A physical object is construed as a set
of successive masses of matter each member of which shares
with the others a certain "organizational" property. Or-
ganizational properties are explained in terms of Locke's
concept of a nominal essence. While this seems to be the
best interpretation of Locke, it is argued both that the
theory fails to provide a satisfactory account of persis-
tence and that its central concepts defy conherent formula-
tion .
Chapter III is devoted to a critical analysis of
Chisholm's theory of persistence. According to Chisholm,
physical objects are logical constructions upon "composita"
or "genuine wholes" of which mereological essentialism is
true. Chisholm's attempts to define the relations of "evo-
lution," "succession" and "constitution" are shown to he
defective. Thus, he has not succeeded in providing an ac-
count of v/hat he calls "loose and popular identity."
The apparent failure of alternative accounts of per-
sistence provides a motivation for reconsidering the status
of the ordinary view. In Chapter IV, the ordinary view is
formulated in a way that initially appears to render it im-
mune to the difficulties raised by the Problem of the Ship
of Theseus. Finally, however, it is shov/n that the ordinary
view rests on a serious confusion that seems to have gone
VI
unnoticed. Unfortunately, the two alternatives thus far
proposed are subject to the same difficulty. Xf so, we may
be forced to reevaluate not only our views about persistence
but also about the ontological status of physical objects.
VI
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CHAPTER I
SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST PERSISTENCE
1. Unsuccessful Attempts to Undermine
the Ordinary View
The ordinary view . If my car came into existence somewhere
in Sweden five years ago and will cease to exist someday,
somewhere, then it has persisted from the former time until
now and will persist from now until the latter time. Since
my car has lost and gained many parts during the time that
it has existed, it has persisted through changes in its
parts. Until we are given reason to think ocherwise, it is
reasonable to assume that when we say, for instance, that
the car in my driveway now is the one I drove to California
last summer, we are using the 'is' of strict identity. The
expression 'the car in my drivev;ay now' refers to the very
same thing to which the expression 'the car I drove to Cali-
fornia last summer' refers. In what follows, I will dis-
cuss various arguments that purport to show that there are
indeed reasons to think otherwise. We will see whether any
of these arguments is coercive.
Le ibniz' law argument against the ordinary view . To say
that the 'is' in a sentence such as "the car in my driveway
now is the car I drove to California last summer" is the
1
2is of strict identity is to say that v;hatever is true of
the referent of 'the car in my driveway now' is true of the
referent of the car I drove to California last summer.
'
Strict identity is an equivalence relation that is governed
by Leibniz' Law:
(LL) (x) (y) [x=y iff (F) (Fx s Fy)
]
But the car in my driveway now, it might be argued, has
parts the car I drove to California last summer lac}:s, and
vice versa. The car I drove to California last summer had
a muffler. The car in my driveway now lacks a muffler.
The car in my driveway now has snow tires. The car I drove
to California last summer did not. Thus, it seems, there
are properties had by one not had by the other. According
to (LL) then, they are not identical.
This line of reasoning is supported by Hume, who
says, " ' tis plain that we must attribute a perfect identity
to this provided all the parts contiriue uninterruptedly and
invariably the same . . . But supposing some very small or
inconsiderable part be added to the mass, or subtracted
from it . . . this absolutely destroys the identity of the
v;hole, strictly speaking."^ This suggests the follov/ing
reductio of the view that some things persist through
changes in their parts:
(Al) (1) Some physical objects persist through changes
in their parts.
3(2) If (1), then (“^x) (3y) Ot) Of) (^Ip) (xhasp
as a part at t and y lacks p as a part at t'
(
t
' > t ) and X - y )
.
(3) If (3x) (3y) (3t) (3f) (3p) (X has p as a part
at t and y lacks p as a part at f (f > t)
,
then Ox) (3y) (3t) (3f ) OF) (x has F at t and
y lacks F at f (f > t) and x = y) .
(^) (x) (y) (x=y (F) (Fx e Fy)
.
(5) No physical object persists through changes in
its parts.
(Al) appears reasonably straightforward. If we suppose that
an object can persist through a change of parts, then it has
at one time a part that it lacks at another. And if it has
as one time a part that it lacks at another, then it has a
property (namely, having that part as a part) that it lacks
at another. But this, it seemis
,
contradicts (LL)
,
v;hich
tells us that identical things share all their properties.
Three replies to the Leibniz' law argument
. There are, how-
ever, three alternatives to accepting (Al)
.
The first in-
vol^7^es a slight adjustment in (IjL) . If we think that change
should be explained in terms of an object gaining and losing
properties, then our concept of identity should allow that
an object a existing at one time is identical to an object b
existing at another time, though a has one set of properties
and b another set of properties. However, considered at one
4time, a and b must share their properties if they are
identical. Thus, LL becomes:
(LL') (x) (y) [x=y iff (t)(F)(Fx,t E Fy,t)]
If we take (LL') as the correct explication of our concept
of identity, then Premise (4) of (Al) becomes:
(4
' ) (x) (y) [x=y (F) (t) (Fxt E Fyt)
]
But then, no contradiction results, for the preceding
premises do nothing to show that an object that changes a
part has properties at one time that it lacks at the very
same time.
Another alternative is to view objects that persist
as possessing dated properties. Thus, rather than saying
that my car has the property of being green simpliciter, we
say that it has the property of being green on July 24,
1974. Turning to (Al)
,
we see that, in this view. Premise
(3) is false. If an object a has p as a part at t , then
it has the property of having p as a part at t 2 » If it
loses p at t^, then it lacks the property of having p as a
part at t
2
* But it lacks that property at t^ as v;ell.
Similarly, at t
2 /
a has the property of having p as a part
at tj^. So, from the fact that an object has at one time a
part it lacks at another, it does not follow that it has
properties at one time that it lacks at another. To say
5that an object changes, then, is to say that it has the
property F at t, and lacks the property F at t', though it
has and lacks these properties respectively throughout the
time that it exists. If we consider objects that persist
as possessing dated properties such as these, then we avoid
tampering with (LL)
,
though, it is clear, we must tamper a
bit with our concept of change.
A third alternative to accepting (Al) is to con-
sider persisting objects as consisting of temporal seg-
3
ments . In doing so, we would take expressions of the form
"b at tj^" and "b at t
2
" as referring, not to the temporally
persisting b, but rather to two temporal segments of b, one
existing at t^^, the other existing at t
2
. If we adopt this
view of persisting objects, then Premise (2) of (Al) is
false. For, from the fact that an object persists through
a change in its parts, it does not follow that there is
something having p as a part at one time and something lack-
ing p as a part at another time and that those things are
identical. On the view we are considering, those things
would be distinct temporal segments of a persisting object.
An advantage of viewing persisting physical objects as
divisible into temporal segments is that it allows us both
to retain our conception of change as the gain and loss of
properties and to retain the pure form of (LL) . However,
it has the disadvantage of being ontologically uneconomical
6and theoretically unclear. For we are left with the task
of explaining the relationship between a persisting indivi-
dual and its temporal segments. Perhaps, then, one of our
other alternatives is preferable. In any case, it should
be clear that (Al) does not force us to conclude that
nothing persists through changes in its parts. Returning
to my car, we can say either of three things: (i) the car
in my driveway now is identical to the car I drove to Cali-
fornia last summ.er because the car in my driveway, though
lacking a muffler now, had one last summer, and the car I
drove to California last summer, though having had a muffler
last summer, lacks one now; (ii) the car in my driveway now
is identical to the car I drove to California last summer
because, though the car in my driveway lacks the property
of having a muffler now, so too does the car I drove to
California last summer; or (iii) the car I drove to Cali-
fornia last summer is not identical to the car in my drive-
way now but rather each of them is a temporal segment of my
car, one that exists now and one that existed last sum.mer.
Leibniz' argument against the ordinary view . Another argu-
ment against persist^ence is suggested by Leibniz: "we can-
not say, speaking according to the exact truth of things,
4that the saiTie whole is preserved when a part is lost. "
He goes on to say that since "whatever has corporeal parts
cannot fail to lose some of them at every moment. . . . ,"
7objects of this kind only appear to persist.^ Persistence
IS what Hume would call a 'fiction' of the mind. The view
proposed by Leibniz seems to be this: a whole consisting of,
say, three atoms a, b, c, is such that, if it loses one of
those atoms, say, c, it is no longer the whole consisting
of a, b, c. So, the whole consisting of a, b, c no longer
exists. Ordinary physical objects are wholes consisting of
numerous parts. If a physical object loses one of those
parts, it is no longer the same whole. So, that object no
longer exists. As Leibniz points out, and as science fur-
ther affirms, physical objects gain and lose parts (i.e.,
atoms) at every moment. So, physical objects do not per-
sist. Again, the argument can be represented as a reductio:
(A2) (1) Some physical objects persist through changes
in their parts.
(2) (x) (x is a physical object x is a whole
consisting of parts)
.
(3) (x) (x is a whole consisting of parts (3t) (at')
[ (x persists from t to t' (f > t) ) -> (y) (y is
a part of x at t and y is a part of x at t')]}.
(4) If (1)
,
then (3x)(3y)(3t)(3t')(3p) (x has p as a
part at t" and x lacks p as a part at t'
(f > t)).
(5) No physical object persists through a change in
its parts.
8A_ reply to Leibniz. in (A2)
,
premise (3) appears to be the
culprit. Before pointing out why it is false, we should
consider why it might seem plausible.
Suppose we have a thing consisting of three parts
a, b, c. The expression "the whole consisting of parts a,
b, c" refers to that thing. With respect to the whole con-
sisting of parts a, b, c, the following is true:
(PI) If b is a part of the whole consisting of parts a,
b, c at t^, then, if the whole consisting of parts
a, b, c exists at t
2 ,
then b is a part of it at t
2
*
We would not want to deny that, any more than we would want
to deny that the whole consisting of parts a, b, c has a,
b, c as parts. So, when Leibniz says that, strictly speak-
ing, the same whole is not preserved when a part is lost,
the plausibility of his remark derives from the fact that,
indeed, if a whole consisting of parts a, b, c loses, say,
part b, then that whole no longer consists of parts a, b,
c. If we think of the expression "same whole" as meaning
"whole consisting of the same parts," then Leibniz' asser-
tion amounts to the trivial, albeit true, claim that a
whole consisting of certain parts no longer consists of
those parts when a part is lost.
We need, however, another argument to prove that the
thing that consisted of parts a, b, c cannot be said, after
losing part b, now to consist of parts a and c. After all.
9v;ith respect to the ordinary physical objects that are the
subject of our investigation, we assume that they, though
being wholes consisting of parts, can consist of some parts
at one time, and other parts at other times. My car, when
it first c^ime into existence, had parts it no longer has.
And now it has parts it did not have when it first came in-
to existence. So, until we are given reason to believe
otherwise, we can assume that Premise (3) of (A2) is false.
Neither (Al) nor (A2) is sufficient to persuade us
that physical objects don't persist through changes in their
parts. We will now turn to the consideration of the problem
of the Ship of Theseus which is thought to supply reasons
for questioning our assumptions about persistence.
2. The Problem of the Ship of Theseus
Plutarch's story and a variation by Hobbes . The problem of
the Ship of Theseus is, as Chisholm is fond of pointing out,
an ancient puzzle. Plato mentions the shd.p, if not the
puzzle, when he has Phaedo explain the reason for the delay
in Socrates' execution. The day before his trial, a certain
ship, the one the Athenians sent to Delos, was crowned with
garlands, a sign that the city was to be kept pure. It was
"the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed
to Crete. ..." That this ship was the subject of philo-
sophical dispute is testified to by Plutarch in his Life of
10
"The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens
returned had thirty oars and was preserved down to the time
of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks
as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their
place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example
among philosophers, for the logical question of things that
grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and
the other contending that it was not the same."”^
Considering the story as it is presented by Plu-
tarch, what features of it appear to raise problems? Sup-
pose v/e conclude that the ship that was crowned with garlands
in 399 B.C. is identical to the ship Theseus once sailed to
Crete. After all, our reasoning might go, ships are con-
structed in such a way that repairs can be made if circum-
stances dictate and often, they do. Our experience in-
cludes cases of ships damaging their hulls against barrier
reefs, losing their masts in storms, severing their keels
on rocky shoals. We suppose that ships can survive calami-
ties of this sort. And if they can, then certainly they
can withstand the normal wear and tear produced by the
exigencies of the tamer situations in which ships normally
find themselves. Properly cared for, a ship might survive
for many years. Given all this, it seems reasonable to
suppose that the ship that was crowned with garlands in
399 B.C. is identical to the ship Theseus sailed to Crete,
11
though the former ship shares, let us assume, no planks
with the latter ship. The changes, after all, were gradu-
al: when the first plank was replaced, the resulting ship
identical to the original, and when a plank of that ship
was replaced, the resulting ship was identical to the pre-
vious ship. And so on, we can suppose, down the line.
Since identity is transitive, it follows that, even when
the final original plank was replaced, the ship composed of
entirely new planks was identical to the original ship.
Thomas Hobbes proposed a variation on the original
story that might cause us to question our conviction that
this identity holds. "Some man had kept the old planks as
they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together
in the same order, had again made a ship of them. . . .
This ship, composed entirely of the original planks, surely
seems to have some claim to being identical with the ship
Theseus sailed to Crete. Here, too, our experience lends
support to this view. We have heard of the enterprising
businessman who bought one of the London Bridges and had it
shipped to Arizona where it was reassembled. There is the
Cloisters in New York which used to be in France. And there
is the Sleigh Bed in my living room which has many times,
since its creation sometime in the 19th Century, been taken
apart for shipping, then reassembled in its new home. Since
these objects persist through disassembling, so, too, can
12
the ship of the Hobbesian man.
Reid and Chisholm on the conventionality of identity claims.
It appears that the reasons for deciding in favor of the
garlanded ship find an equal match in those on the side of
the ship of the Hobbesian man. Some philosophers have taken
this as evidence that strict identity plays no role in the
persistence conditions for physical objects. They suggest
that identity with respect to physical objects existing at
different times is a "matter of convention." Its conven-
tional nature, they claim, is revealed by considering the
apparent disanalogy between personal and physical object
identity
.
Thomas Reid, for instance, says that identity
has no fixed nature when applied to bodies, and
questions about the identity of a body are very
often questions about words. But identity, when
applied to persons, has no ambiguity and admits
not of degrees, or of more or less . . .
Reid takes personal identity as a paradigm case of strict
persistence. The question whether persons persist through
changes in their parts is moot, since persons, according to
Reid, have no parts. Regular physical objects, however, do
have parts, and, according to Reid, our decision to pro-
nounce an object "the same" after an alteration of parts is
determined by factors of convenience and custom. Thus, Reid
thinks that there are two concepts of identity--one that ap-
plies in cases of personal identity and one that applies in
13
cases of bodily identity. The former concept he calls
perfect identity,' the latter 'imperfect identity.'
What considerations led Reid to the conclusion that
perfect identity' has no application with respect to the
persistence of physical objects? Chisholm, whose sympathies
lie with Reid on this matter, offers some }iint. Chisholm
asks us to consider some "problem" cases of personal iden-
tity
,
cases that are designed to illustrate the disanology
between personal and bodily identity. One case in particu—
involves imagining oneself undergoing fission, where one
person "goes off" to the left and the other "goes off" to
the right. He says.
It seems to me first that there is no possibility
whatever that you would be both the person on the
right and the person on the left. It seems to me,
secondly, that there a possibility that you
would be one or the other of those two persons. I
think, moreover, that you could be one of those
persons and yet have no memory at all of your pres-
ent existence.
Supposing you knew that the person going off to the left
were going to experience a miserable life, "no fears that
you might have, about being the half on the left, could
reasonably be allayed by the adoption of a convention,
though it be laid dovm by the highest authorities."^^
This case is parallel, in relevant respects, to that
of the ships. Yet, in the case of the ships, our ambiva-
lence between the two leaves open the possibility of
deciding, by means of some convention, that one or the
14
other is imperfectly identical to the original ship. As
we have seen in our discussion of Reid, the supposed fact
that the decision is based on convention is evidence enough
that we are not here dealing with perfect identity. Thus,
Reid and, I think, Chisholm, are presupposing that if a
question of identity can be decided by convention, then the
kind of identity involved is imperfect identity. We can
introduce here Chisholm's terms for these two kinds of
identity, namely 'x is strictly identical to y' and 'x is
loosely identical to y . ' We are already familiar with the
relation of strict identity. V7ith respect to loose iden-
tity, the following seems to hold:
(P2) X is loosely identical to y iff a decision that x
and y are identical is based on convention.
This suggests the following anti-persistence argument:
(A3) (1) If physical objects existing at different times
can only be loosely identical, then physical
objects don't persist through changes in their
parts
.
(2) Physical objects existing at different times
can only be loosely identical.
(3) Physical objects don't persist through changes
in their parts.
A replv to Reid and Chisholm. Chisholm's fission case is
^
supposed to demonstrate that since the person fission case
15
can't be decided by convention, we should conclude that
identity, with respect to persons, is strict identity. Let
us compare the person fission case with the ship case in
order to see where the purported difference lies. in both
cases we would want to deny, to avoid violation of transi-
tivity
,
that both 'later' things are identical to the
'earlier' one. Presumably, the fact that each ship appears
to be an equally good candidate suggests that neither is
strictly identical to the earlier one. But why doesn't this
fact yield the same result in the case of the persons? As
Chisholm himself admits, if we suppose that neither person
has any memory of his present experience, "there might well
be no criterion by means of which you or anyone else could
decide which of the two halves was in fact yourself.
The reason, then, appears to be this: in the case of
the ships, we could imagine an advocate for the Hobbesian
ship and an advocate for the garlanded ship unable to come
to any agreement, appealing to a 'high authority.' The
fact that the decision might go either way is seen as a
reason for supposing that strict identity is no longer at
issue. But the case is no different when we consider per-
sons. Suppose the right hand person insists that he is
identical to you, and the left hand person insists that ^
is identical to you. Couldn't a high authority, after care-
fully considering the facts of the case, decide on pruden-
16
tial grounds (support for children, mortgage payments) that
the right hand person is identical to you? He would make
his decision on prudential grounds since he has no better
criterion on which to base it. All the authority can do is
decide that one side or the other is loosely identical to
you. There remains the possibility that, in fact, the left
hand person is strictly identical to you. But doesn't there
remain, in the ship case, though an authority decides the
Hobbesian ship is loosely identical to the original ship,
the possibility that the garlanded ship is strictly identi-
cal to the original ship? If the ship case is really dif-
ferent from the person case, then I think this possibility
must be denied. I am not at all sure that it should be.
The point is this: unless we assume that it is not
possible that either later ship is strictly identical to the
earlier ship, then the fact that a conventional decision
might go either way does not yield the result that v;e are
dealing only with some sort of spurious identity. Since we
have not yet been convinced that this is not possible, (A3)
carries no v/eight. (A3) gains what force it has from
reasoning such as this: if it is difficult to decide which
of two things is identical to another, then neither is
identical to the other. Once we point out, however, that
problem cases of personal identity can pose the same ques-
tions as problem cases of physical object identity, the
17
weakness of this reasoning becomes apparent.
^_e four possibilities . It should be clear that the Prob-
lem of the Ship of Theseus presents us with four possibili-
ties: either (i) the ship that was crowned with garlands in
399 B.C. is identical to the original ship; or (ii) the
ship of the Hobbesian man is identical to the original ship;
or (iii) both the garlanded ship and the Hobbesian ship are
identical to the original ship; or (iv) neither ship is
identical to the original ship. in considering the Chis-
holm/Reid claim that there is a disanalogy between personal
and physical object identity, we concluded that it was not
sufficient to persuade us that we should abandon strict
identity. The fact that we lack a clear criterion for de-
ciding between the two ships does not entail, by itself,
that neither is strictly identical to the original. A
proponent of the fourth possibility would do better to show
that none of the other possibilities is tenable. Of
course, if the fourth possibility is the only acceptable
one, then v;e must deny that physical objects strictly per-
sist through changes in their parts.
An argument for the fourth possibility . Our discussion of
the four possibilities suggests the following argument:
(A4) (1) Either possibility (i) is true, or (ii) is true,
or (iii) is true, or (iv) is true.
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(2) Possibilities (i), (ii), (iii) are false.
(3) (iv) is true.
(4) If (iv) is true, then the original ship did not
persist through changes in its parts.
(5) If the ship did not persist, then in general
physical objects don't persist through such
changes.
(6) Physical objects don't persist through such
changes
.
Let us see, then, whether Premise (2) of (A4) is
true. To do so, we will first consider, v/ith respect to
each of the first three possibilities, whether there are
any positive reasons for thinking it is true. If we find
there are none, we can then determine whether the lack of
any positive reasons constitutes sufficient grounds for con-
ceding to the advocates of (A4)
.
The first possibility: the principle of gradu al change
.
Suppose we stick with our initial reasoning, that which led
to the conclusion that the garlanded ship is identical to
the original ship. That reasoning was based on the assump-
tion that a thing can change its parts provided that the
change is gradual. The relevant persistence principle is
this
:
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(P3) X at t = y at t’ (f > t) if (p) (X at t lacks p as
a part and y at t' has p as a part acquired p by
a gradual change).
There are, however, examples of what might be con-
sidered gradual change that violate our intuitions about
identity. Carrying the ship case a bit further, and sup-
posing that, during the course of two thousand years or so,
the planks of the garlanded ship were gradually replaced
with others of a different size and different material, we
might find ourselves forced to admit that the Boeing 747
Jetliner that just took off from Kennedy Airport is identi-
cal to the ship Theseus sailed to Crete. Given this sort
case, it might appear that an essential feature of gradual
change is the resemblance the replacement parts bear to the
replaced parts. That is, if a change is to count as a
gradual change, the part that is removed must be replaced
15by one that resembles it.
Even allowing a generous interpretation of the re-
semblance relation required to elucidate the notion of a
gradual change, (P3) will not do. For suppose that Jason
and his Argonauts possessed a ship closely resembling the
ship Theseus sailed to Crete, and that Jason replaced all
but one oarlock of his ship with Theseus' ship minus the
relevant oarlock of that ship. The replacement part, name-
ly Theseus' ship minus one oarlock, resembles the replaced
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part, namely Jason's ship minus one oarlock. it would be
odd to say the ship Jason now has is identical to the ship
he had before the change. But if we add one further feature
to our story, we get an even more unwelcome result. Suppose
that after using Theseus' ship minus one oarlock as the re-
placement part for Jason's ship, we replace the oarlock of
Jason s original ship with the oarlock of Theseus' ship.
Having done that, we are left, if (P3) is true, with two
ships identical to the ship Jason had before the change,
since each is produced by adding a similar part to a part
of the original. As we will see in our discussion of the
third possibility, this result runs counter to our most
basic assumptions about identity.
The second possibility: the principle of shared decomposi-
tion . Let us, then, consider the second possibility, name-
ly that the ship of the Hobbesian man is identical to the
original ship. There, our reasoning was based on the as-
sumption that if one thing shares its parts with another,
then they are, in fact, one and the same' thing. That is:
(P4) X at t = y at t ' if (p) (p is a part of x at t = p
is a part of y^ at t').
This assumption, however, needs refinement. While the
planks of the Hobbesian ship are those of the original ship,
not all of its parts are. Surely, it has atoms the origin-
al ship did not have. In*order to express our assumption
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more accurately, we must appeal to the concept of a decom-
position. What we take to be the parts of an object de-
pends upon how we "take the object apart." We can consider
tne parts of a ship to be atoms, or molecules, or planks,
or a hull, a foredeck and a galley. For any "kind" of
part, such that an object can be said to consist completely
of that kind of part, there is a decomposition of the ob-
ject into that kind of part. Taking x is a part of y as
primitive, and defining overlapp ing as:
(Dl) X overlaps y = df . (3p) (p is a part of x and p
is a part of y)
.
a decomposition of an object M can be defined as:
(D2) D is a decomposition of M = df. (i) (p) (p 6 D -> p
is a part of M) ; (ii) (p) (s) (p e D and S e D and
p 7^ s p does not overlap s) ; and (iii) (p) (p is
a part of M (3s) (s e. D and s overlaps p) )
Thus, no member of a decomposition of an object overlaps
another and every part of that object is a member of some
decomposition set of it. Appealing to this concept, we can
now say that a thing existing at one time is identical to a
thing existing at another provided they share a decomposi-
tion. ^
(P5) X at t = y at t' if (3D) (D is a decomposition of
X at t and D is a decomposition of y at t') •
The ship of the Hobbesian man and the ship Theseus sailed
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to Crete are identical since the set that is the decomposi-
tion into planks of one is the same as the set that is the
decomposition into planks of the other.
Unfortunately, (P5), too, faces difficulties. If
we suppose that sharing a decomposition is a necessary con-
dition for the identity of a thing existing at one time and
a thing existing at another, then ultimately, the result is
what we might call an extreme form of atomism. We supposed
that the ship Theseus sailed to Crete and the ship of the
Hobbesian man were identical since they shared a decom.posi-
tion into planks. But if we are to be sure that the planks
of the original ship are identical to the planks of the
Hobbesian ship, then they, too, must share a decomposition.
/
So, too, for the parts of the planks and for their parts.
Finally, we might arrive at some smallest indivisible par-
ticles. Let us call these "atoms." (P5)
,
then, amounts to
the claim that a thing existing at one time is identical to
a thing existing at another provided they share a decompo-
sition into atoms. This seems a far more conservative sug-
gestion than that v/ith which we started.
It might be suggested, at this point, that (P5) is
better seen as simply a sufficient, not a necessary, con-
dition for the identity of things existing at different
times. But if we attempt to avoid atomism by insisting
that a different principle operates with respect to the
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planks than does with respect to the ship, we are obligated
to explain first what the principle might be and second
what reason we have for thinking that the principle applies
in one case and not in the other. if we take (P3) as a
sufficient, though not necessary, condition for the identi-
ty of things existing at different times, then, since the
planks themselves were not disassembled, it might be said
that (P3) applies to them. (P5) would then be left for
cases of disassembled things.
But our lack of success in formulating a correct
version of (P3) is paralleled in the case of (P5) . It is
not clear that (P5) works in the case of disassembled ob-
jects. Suppose that the ship Theseus sailed to Crete was
disassembled and a number of centuries later the planks
were used in the construction of Sancho Panza's windmill.
Though the ship and the windmill share a decomposition,
namely, the set containing the planks as members, we may
well be disinclined to think them identical.
The third possibility
. Ignoring for the moment the inade-
quacy of (P3) and (P5) as sufficient conditions for identi-
ty across time, there is a more general problem inherent in
our suggestion that they should serve only as sufficient
conditions. This problem is brought out by consideration of
the third possibility with respect to the identity of the
ships, namely that both the Hobbesian ship and the ship that
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was crowned with garlands are identical to the original
snip. If,, in our attempts to deal with the first two
possibilities, we had successfully formulated two prin-
ciples, each sufficient, though not necessary, conditions
for identity across time, we v;ould be forced to the conclu-
sion that both ships are identical to the original ship.
And yet we have no principle to insure that the two ships
are themselves identical. Well we should not; surely, if
we assume that the ship of the Hobbesian man and the ship
that was crowned with garlands could exist at the same time,
then the supposition that they are identical would violate
our most basic convictions about identity. The ship of the
Kobbesian man has properties that the garlanded ship does
not. The denial that they are identical stands us in no
better stead. We are assuming that identity is an equiva-
lence relation and so, is transitive. Yet, if the two
ships are not themselves identical but are each identical
to the original ship, then we must deny that identity is
transitive. In discussing the Reid/Chisholm argument, we
already rejected this possibility.
Another approach to the fourth possi bility. We have now
considered the first three possibilities. The third is
clearly false. With respect to the first two, we have not
found them to be false, but rather have found that the
general metaphysical principle underlying each defies
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straightforward formulation. Are we ready yet to accept
the fourth possibility and so concede to the proponent of
(A4)? The proponent of (A4) argues that we should accept
the fourth possibility given the falsity of the other three.
On this line of reasoning, the fourth possibility is not
conceived as having positive reasons in its favor but is
instead seen as the only choice left to us. Since, at this
point, the first two remain open, we should not feel forced
to accept the fourth.
(A4) has as a premise that the fourth possibility
entails the non—persistence of physical objects through
changes in their parts. But the following entailment also
holds
:
(P6) If physical objects do not persist through changes
in their parts, then possibility (iv) is true.
Given the truth of (P5)
,
some philosophers have
thought it better to approach the problem from a perspec-
tive opposite to that of the proponent of (A4). Chisholm
and Locke, for instance, ask us to make the troubling as-
sumption that physical objects do not persist through
17
changes in their parts. Only by doing so, they argue,
can we arrive at a solution to problems such as that of the
Ship of Theseus. The viability of that assumption, and so
of the fourth possibility, is then to be determined by the
success of their proposed solutions.
26
Given the recalcitrance of the first two possibili-
ties, we might benefit from considering this approach. In
Chapters II and III, where the theories of Locke and Chis-
holm, respectively, will be examined in detail, we will do
just that. Neither theory, it will be argued, lives up to
its claims and so neither provides a reason to accept the
troubling assumption upon which both are based.
Both theories, however, do provide further insight
into the ordinary view of persistence to which v/e return in
Chapter IV. There, the ordinary view, and with it the
first two possib.ilities
,
will be subjected to greater
scrutiny. The ordinary view rests, I will argue, on an
undeniably shaky foundation. If my reasons for thinking so
are right, the ordinary view cannot yield a solution to the
Problem of the Ship of Theseus. The troubling assumption
made by Locke and by Chisholm appears a relatively tame
alternative once this foundation is revealed. Unfortunate-
ly, their theories borrow enough from the ordinary view
that they, too, fall prey to its difficulties. We are
left, then, without a solution, but not without a clear
idea why philosophers have had such trouble finding one.
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.
CHAPTER I I
LOCKE ON PERSISTENCE
1. Locke's Principles of Identity
and Diversity
Our ideas of identity and diversity
. John Locke is one
Philosopher whose views about identity are worth consider”
ing in light of the difficulties raised by the problem of
the Ship of Theseus. It is often thought that Locke was an
early proponent of the theory that identity is relative.
In what follows, an alternative interpretation of Locke
will be developed, one that appears, I think, to be more
consistent with various of his ontological presuppositions.
V7e can then determine whether such an interpretation yields
a solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
The first paragraph of Locke's chapter on Identity
and Diversity consists in an initially puzzling juxtaposi-
tion of identity and diversity as concepts that arise from
considering an object at a single time and identity and
diversity as concepts that arise from comparing an object
existing at one time, with an object existing at a different
time. To give an adequate account of Locke's views, it
will be necessary to determ.ine what role these concepts are
intended to play.
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Locke begins by saying, "Another occasion the mind
often takes of comparing, is the very being of things,
when, considering anything as existing at any determined
time and place, we compare it with itself existing at
another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and
diversity." Given just this much, it seems clear that
Locke takes identity through time as the paradigm case of
identity. That he should think so is a result of his be-
lief that identity and diversity are relations, and as
such, hold between (at least) two things.
We get our ideas of relations from the comparison
of two (or more) objects. There is a difficulty with the
relation of identity, however, because it is a relation
holding between a thing and itself, not between two things
Hume, whose approach to the problem was much the same as
Locke's put the matter this way:
the view of any one object is not sufficient to
convey the idea of identity. For in that propo-
sition an object is the same with itself
,
if the
idea expressed by the word ob j ect
,
were no ways
distinguished from that meant by itself ; we really
should m.ean nothing. . . . One object conveys the
idea of unity, not that of identity.^
Thus, it appears that both Locke and Hume had a vague pre-
monition of the Fregean insight that in significant iden-
tity statements the expressions flanking the identity sign
have different senses. They overlooked the existence of
identity statements such as "the library is the tallest
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building on campus" and so assumed that the only signifi-
cant statements of identity are those asserting the identi-
ty of a thing existing at one time with a thing existing at
a distinct time. Viewing the m.atter in this way, Hume and
Locke could also account for the relational nature of
identity since objects standing in the relation of identity
at different times, this provides the difference re-
quisite to comparison.
Sameness of spatio-temporal location: an unsuccessful
formulation
. While Hume seems to have thought that the
"view of any one object" plays no role in our acquisition
of the concept of identity, Locke thought that it did. For
he next says, "when we see anything to be in any place at
any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that
it is that very thing, and not another which at the same
time exists in another place, how like and indistinguish-
able soever it may be in all other respects." The rela-
tion of identity is like that of 'being as big as.' Though
it is true that everything is as big as itself, and that
that fact is implicit in judgments we make by means of that
relation, the idea would never arise in us simply from com-
paring, as it were, a thing with itself. Locke appears to
have thought that our ideas of relations such as these
arise only because there is some question as to whether two
things stand in them. As he puts it, "when we therefore
33
demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers al-
ways to something that existed such and such, a time in such
a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the
same as itself, and no other.
When we consider an object at a single time, there
is no room for any question as to its identity to arise.
According to Locke, each thing occupies a unique 'place' at
a single time. The fact that other things, even though
they may resemble the considered object, occupy distinct
places is sufficient to insure that they are other than the
considered object. Furthermore, we can be certain that
each object occupies a unique place because "we never find-
ing, nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same
kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we
rightly conclude, that, whatever exists anywhere at any
time, excludes all of the seune kind, and is there itself
5
alone." Shortly, we will examine in more detail Locke's
suggestion concerning the role of spatial location in de-
termining identity, but for the time being a rough charac-
terization of its role will suffice: each thing occupies
(at a particular time) a particular place from which all
other things of its kind are excluded. This restriction
with respect to kind is necessary since it is possible for
a material thing and a spiritual thing both to occupy a
single place at a single time. The fact that each thing of
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a kind has its unique place at a single time plays an im-
portant part in determinations of the identity of things
existing at different times. Suppose you want to know
whether an object at t^, 0
^,
is identical to an object at
t^, Since it is possible for one thing to occupy dif-
ferent places at different times, the spatial location of
O2 or would be of no use. What you need is to determine
whether there is some place such that both and O. were
in that place at somie time. Since no two things of the
same kind can be in the same place at the same time, it
would follow that O2 and are identical. If you know
that 0
^
came into existence at a particular place at a par-
ticular time, and you know that O2 came into existence at
that same time in the same place, then you can conclude
that O2 and are identical. The time and place of a
thing's beginning to exist affords a means by which we can
answer the question "Is the thing picked out by this tem-
poral description the same as the thing picked out by that
temporal description?" Locke's own words are as follows:
One thing cannot have tv;o beginnings of existence,
it being impossible for two things of the same
kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the
very same place; or one and the same thing in dif-
ferent places. “That, therefore that had one begin-
ning, is the same thing; and that which had a dif-
ferent beginning in time and place from that, is
not the same, but diverse.^
We can now turn to the task of attempting to formu-
late Locke's words in such a way that they produce the
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results he intended them to have. We have seen that Locke
makes the following statement concerning the relation be-
tween a thing and its spatial location: "we never finding,
nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same time. ..."
This suggests the following interpretation:
(PI)
i- O 2 and (3t) (3p) is in p at t and O 2
is in p at t) .
The concept of complete occupation
. Though (PI) is a fair-
ly literal translation of Locke's words, it does not serve
his purpose. Places are regions of space that, unless
otherwise restricted, may be of any size. Thus, my desk is
in my study and my bookcase is in my study and so I am en-
titled to say that they are both in the same place. Surely
Locke intended something more restrictive. The place of a
thing is presumably some region of space that is completely
filled up by that thing. Locke's idea can be captured by
the following definition:
(Dl) O completely occupies p at t iff (i) (p') (p' is
part of p at t *> (30') (O' is part of 0 at t and
O' is in p' at t) ; (ii) (O') (O' is part of 0 at t
(3p') (p' is part of p at t and O' is in p' at t) .
Using (Dl)
,
(Pi) becomes
(P2) '^^(Oj^ i O2 and (3t) Op) (Oj^ completely occupies p
at t and O
2
completely occupies p at t) .
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ihis more restrictive characterization of an object's
place is perhaps what Locke had in mind when he later said
that It IS impossible "for two things of the same kind to
be or exist in the very instant, in the very same place.
From (P2) we can derive a sufficient condition for
identity:
(P3) (3t) (-3P) (O^ completely occupies p at t and O 2
completely occupies p at t)-^ ^1 “ ^2*
and the converse of (P3) provides a statement of the neces-
sary condition of diversity:
(P4) ^ completely occupies p at
t and 0^ completely occupies p at t) .
Locke also makes it clear that it is impossible for
"one and the same thing" to exist "in different places at
the same instant" (p. 440). This assertion can be rendered
as
:
(P5)
-^<>{0^^ = O 2 and (3p) (3p') (3t) (p p' and 0^^ com-
pletely occupies p at t and O 2 completely occupies
p
' at t ) }
.
VJhile (P5) is a fairly literal rendering of Locke's words,
(P6) resembles (PI) - (P4) more closely, and follows from
LL:
(P6) = O
2
and ( p) ( t) (0^^ completely occupies p
at t and O
2
does not completely occupy p at t) }
.
From (P6), v/e can derive a necessary condition for identity:
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(P7)
^2"*^ (3p) (3t) completely occupies p at
t ana 0
^
does not completely occupy p at t) .
and a sufficient condition foir diversity:
(P8) Op) (3t) (0^ completely occupies p at t and ©2
does not completely occupy p at t) -> 0
^,
Since, according to Locke, every substance occupies space,
the following is true:
(P9) (O) (3t) (3p) (o completely occupies p at t)
.
(P9) together with (P7) yields a new necessary condition
for identity:
(PIO) ~ (3t) (3p) (0^ completely occupies p at
t and 0
^
completely occupies p at t)
.
Taking (P3) and (PIC) together, we get a statement of
necessary and sufficient conditions for identity:
(Pll) = 0
^
iff (3p) (3t) completely occupies p at
t and ©2 completely occupies p at t)
The same reasoning applies with respect to diversity.
Given (P9)
,
we can infer from (P4)
,
a new statement of a
necessary condition for diversity:
(P12) ^ (3t) (Oj^ completely occupies p at t
and ©2 does not completely occupy p at t)
which, together with (P8), yields a statement of necessary
and sufficient conditions for diversity:
(P13) Oj^ O
2
iff (9p) (3t) (0^ completely occupies p at
t and O
2
does not completely occupy p at t) .
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Brody on Locke's principles of identity and diversity
. If
our earlier conjectures as to Locke's intent concerning
the role of a thing's spatial location in determinations
of identity and diversity are right, then we should view
(Pll) and (P13) as stating respectively the necessary and
sufficient conditions of identity and diversity that are
used in making determinations of the identity and diver-
sity of things existing at the Scime time. But are we
thereby committed to thinking that Locke rejects the prin-
ciple of the indiscernibility of identicals? Baruch Brody
ascribes to Locke the view that "(2') x and y are identi-
cal if they are in the same place at the same time" and
suggests that he ought to have held "(2") x and y are
identical if they are in the same place at the same time
and have all of their properties in common." Brody, ap-
parently ignoring Locke's restriction that what Brody calls
(2') applies only to things of the same kind, rejects it on
the grounds that "after all, my body and I are in the same
place at the same time, but they cannot be identical since
there are some properties they do not have in common.
Since (2") does not face this problem, in that it "poses a
more restrictive condition for identity than (2')," Brody
takes it to be the plausible alternative but ends by saying,
"unfortunately, it is not the one that Locke adopted."
In reply to Brody, it should first be noted that
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his ( 2 ") is redundant. If we specify that it is sufficient
for the identity of x and y that they have all their prop-
erties in common, then there is no need to specify further
that they must also be in the same place at the same time.
Furthermore, and m.ore importantly, Brody fails to recognize
the purpose of Locke's statements of identity. Presumably,
Locke does not v;ant to deny the principle of the indis-
cernibility of identicals; what he is after is a criterion
by means of which we can judge whether things satisfy that
principle. An advantage of our interpretation is precisely
that it takes Locke to be singling out a property, namely
sameness of place, that can serve as such a criterion.
The beginnings of existence . We now turn to a further elu-
cidation of Locke's views as to the role of a thing's be-
ginning of existence in determinations of identity. It was
suggested earlier that Locke took the problem of determin-
ing the identity of things considered at different times to
be a slightly different problem from that of determining
the identity of things considered at a single time. He
seemiCd to think that if we are considering, say, an object
O2 at t2 and wondering whether it is identical to an object
at t^, then, if we find that they have the same begin-
ning, then we can conclude that they are in fact one and
the same thing. If, on the other hand, they have different
beginnings, then we can conclude that they are diverse.
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Once again, it is best to see Locke as attempting to pro-
vide a criterion for use in making determinations of iden-
tity or diversity.
What, then, is a thing's beginning? Presumably,
Locke means to suggest that it is the time and place at
which a thing first exists. Using our concept of complete
occupation, we can devise the following principle:
(P14) 0 begins to exist in p at t iff 0 completely
occupies p at t and ~(3t')(3p') (t' < t and O
completely occupies p' at t').
Thus, v/hen Locke says "one thing cannot have two beginnings
of existence," we should take him to mean:
(P15) '^OCBt) ( 3t
'
) (3p) (3p') (t t' and p p
'
and
begins to exist in p at t and 0
^^
begins to
exist in p ' at t
'
)
.
(P15) yields, in turn, the following sufficient condition
of diversity:
(P16) (-3t) (3t') (3p) (3p') (t t' and p 7^ p
'
and 0^^
begins to exist in p at t and O 2 begins to
exist in p' at t') ^ 02 *
The difficulty with (P15) and (P16) is that given what
Locke says, it seems they are to follow from (P 6 ) and (P 8 )
respectively. "... one thing cannot have two beginnings
of existence ... it being impossible for . . . one and
12
the same thing [to be or exist] in different places." It
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is clear that they do not so follow. We would do better,
then, to interpret Locke as saying merely:
(P17) = O
2
and (3t) (3p) begins to exist in
p at t and O
2
does not begin to exist in p at t)
,
which yields its companion sufficient condition for diver-
sity :
(P18) (t) (p) begins to exist in p at t and O 2
does not begin to exist in p at t) 0^.
To demonstrate that (P18) is derivable from (P8)
,
we must
show that if (P8) is true, then (P18) is true. That is, we
must show that if 0^ begins to exist in p at t and O 2 does
not begin to exist in p at t, then 0^^ completely occupies
p at t and O2 does not completely occupy p at t. Given
(P14)
,
if begins to exist in p at t, then 0^ completely
occupies p at t and there is no time t' prior to t such
that occupies a place p' (identical or not to p) at t ' .
Supposing that the first disjunct is true, then 0^ com-
pletely occupies p at t, but O2 does not. If the second
disjunct is true, then there is a place p' (identical or
not to p) that is completely occupied by O
2
at t' but not
by 0^. So, we can conclude that (P18) is derivable from
(P8).
Turning to Locke's other assertion, namely that two
things cannot have one beginning of existence, we get:
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(P19) O
2
and (3p) (3t) (0^^ begins to exist in
p at t and 0
^
begins to exist in p at t) .
From (P2.9) we can derive a sufficient condition for iden-
tity :
(P20) (3p) (3t) begins to exist in p at t and O 2
begins to exist in p at t) 0^ = O 2 .
These should follow from (P2) and (P3) respectively, since
Locke says that two things cannot have one beginning of
existence, "it being impossible for two things of the same
kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same
13place." Fortunately, given (P14)
,
they are easily de-
rivable.
The application of the principles of identity and diver-
sity . In our treatment of Locke's concept of complete
occupation, we were able to derive criteria for making de-
terminations of the identity and diversity of things exist-
ing at the same time. These criteria consisted in neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for identity and diversity.
The question now arises whether we can transform, in a
parallel fashion, (P18) and (P20) into biconditionals. If
we can, then the following must be true;
(P21) ^ (0p) (3t) (Oj^ begins to exist in p at t
and O
2
does not begin to exist in p at t)
.
0i = O2 -> Op) (3t) (0^ begins to exist in p at t
and ©2 begins to exist in p at t)
.
(P22)
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The problem with (P21) and (P22) is that the;-, do
not appear to hold for eternal objects. If we suppose
(though Locke would prefer another example) that numbers
are eternal objects, and if (P21) is true, then we would be
required to say that the number 9 and the number 5 are
diverse only if one begins to exist in a place at a time
that the other doesn't. But if numbers are eternal, then
neither 9 nor 5 begins to exist anywhere at any time.
Similarly, if the number 9 and the number that is the
square root of 81 are identical, and (P22) is true, then
they both must begin to exist at the same time in the same
place. But if numbers are eternal, then neither begins to
exist anywhere at any time. So, if (P21) and (P22) are
true, then 9 and 5 fail to be diverse, and 9 and the square
root of 91 fail to be identical.
Locke does not address himself to the general prob-
lem of eternal objects. Rather, he says "We have the ideas
but of three sorts of substances: 1. God. 2. Finite in--
14telligences. 3. Bodies." So, God is the only object
Locke takes to be eternal, or at least is the only eternal
object Locke wishes to consider. Of God, Locke says,
"First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and
everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can
be no doubt. It would help Locke's cause if we could
take him to be saying that the principles concerning
44
identity and diversity that he has just presented are in-
tended to apply only to those things concerning whose iden-
tity there can be doubt, namely, things that do have be-
ginnings, or contingent things. If this interpretation is
acceptable, then we can adopt (P21) and (P22) and, accord-
ingly, the following biconditionals:
(P23) 0^ ^ ©2 iff Op) (3t) { 0
^
begins to exist in p at
t and does not begin to exist in p at t)
.
(P24) = O
2
iff (3p) (3t) begins to exist in p at
t and O
2
begins to exist in p at t)
.
If we are correct in our interpretation, then Locke intends
(P23) and (P24) as criteria for determining when things
existing at different times are the same or diverse. Thus,
we should substitute for *
^2 * ^^P^^ssions such as
'O at t^' and '0 at tg , ' where the objects referred to by
these expressions are things of the same Lockean ontologic-
al category (i.e., bodies or finite intelligences). For,
after the above statement about God, Locke goes on to say:
Secondly, Finite spirits, having had each its de-
terminate time and place of beginning to exist,
the relation to that time and place will always
determine to each of them its identity, as long
as it exists. Thirdly, the same will hold of
every particle o^f matter, to which no addition or
subtraction of matter being made, it is the same.-^°
Some philosophers have taken this last statement as
an indication that Locke intended his principles concerning
spatial relation and the beginning of existence to apply
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only to simple substances; that when Locke said we have
ideas but, of three sorts of substances: 1. God. 2.
Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies," he meant by 'bodies,'
individual particles of matter or what Locke called
'atoms.' The evidence for this view is found in Locke's
phrase 'every particle of matter' and in his later state-
ments concerning the ' principium individuationis .
' After
stating what he takes it to be, he says "Though this seems
easier to conceive in simple substances or modes; yet, when
reflected on, is not more difficult in compound ones."^^
This is taken to be a transitional statement. That is,
having told us about "the principium individuationis " for
simple substances, he will now do the same for compound
ones. If this view is correct, then the principles we have
formulated would not apply, as we have suggested, to con-
tingent things in general, but rather only to those that
are simple.
This interpretation is not without its difficulties.
First, it is not in general true that when Locke uses the
expression 'Bodies,' he means it to refer only to atoms.
Second, we have seen that after Locke names the three sorts
of substances of which we have ideas, he then explains hov;
his principles concerning the beginning of existence apply
to each of them. Unless we suppose that Locke does not
count our ideas of compound bodies as ideas of substances.
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then It seems strange that he would claim, without mention-
ing why, that his principles apply only to one sort of
body. But Locke does often talk about our ideas of com-
pound bodies as ideas of substances. Furthermore, immedi-
ately after his statement about 'every particle of matter,'
he goes on to argue that the denial of his principles con-
cerning spatial location and the beginnings of existence
results in absurdity
. He illustrates the absurdity by say-
ing,
For example : could two bodies be in the same place
at the same time; then those parcels of matter must
be one and the same, take them great or little;
nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For by
the same reason that tv;o particles of matter may be
in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which
when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction
of identity and diversity of one and more and
renders it ridiculous.!^
Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that when Locke
used the expression "every particle of matter," he meant it
to refer not only to atoms but also to the things that they
compose
.
The limitations of Locke's principles . 'Section 4 of Locke's
chapter marks a puzzling change in the focus of his discus-
sion. Though he sugjgests that he is merely pointing out
how his principles concerning spatial location and begin-
nings of existence apply in particular cases, in the course
of doing so he alludes to additional factors requisite to
making judgments of identity through time. It should be
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clear that Locke's principles concerning spatial location
are hardly sufficient. For example, suppose I am curious
whether the ship Theseus sailed to Crete is in fact the
ship that was crowned with garlands in 399 B.C. According
to Locke, I need merely determine whether they began to
exist at the same time in the same place, or whether there
is some time at which they both completely occupied the
same place. Clearly, this suggestion merely raises the
question in a slightly different way. That is, my curios-
ity about the identity of these ships might well manifest
itself in this way : did the ship that was crowned with gar-
lands in 399 B.C. come into existence at the same time, in
the same place, that the ship that Theseus sailed to Crete
did or did it come into existence at some point during the
change of planks? Part of my curiosity about the identity
of the ships stems from the fact that I am unsure about the
origin of the garlanded ship. Locke's principles do not
allay my curiosity, they serve only to refocus it.
Whether or not Locke fully realized the limitations
of his principles, in Section 4, he does suggest additional
ones that come closer to answering the central question
concerning identity *through time: do things persist through
changes in their parts? Just how he intends to answer the
question, however, is not entirely clear. Many interpre-
ters have attributed to Locke the view that identity is
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relative. Certainly, there is evidence in Section 4, and
in the sections that follow it, to support this interpreta-
tion. On the other hand, if one places Locke's views about
identity in the context of his larger philosophical views,
it is no longer clear that we should attribute such a view
to him. It v;ill be worthwhile to examine what he says
rather closely
,
and in so doing attempt to discover whether
any coherent theory of persistence (and so identity) can be
found.
2. The Problem of Differing
Persistence Criteria
Some metaphysical underpinnings
. If, in Section 4, we take
Locke as attempting to answer the question whether things
persist through changes in their parts, it is reasonably
clear that his answer is, "It depends." With respect to
atoms, he says, the question is moot, since atoms have no
parts. With respect to what Locke calls "masses of matter,"
the answer is "no." He says.
In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined to-
gether into the same mass . . . whilst they exist
united together, the mass, consisting of the same
atoms, must be the sanie mass, or the same body,
let the parts be_^ ever so differently jumbled.
But if one of these atoms be taken av/ay, or a new
one added, it is no longer the same mass or the
same body.^^
Already, we are presented with difficulties. When
Locke discusses, at various points in the Essay , our ideas
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of substance, he brings into play the notion of masses of
22
matter. Roughly, his view seems to be this: the real and
basic existents are atoms, or particles of matter and col-
lections of these atoms or particles. These parcels of
matter have two different 'kinds' of essence: real and
nominal. The nominal essence 'depends' on the real essence
in the following way: parcels of matter are ranked into
sorts. In order that a particular parcel of matter be, for
instance, gold, it must have certain observable properties.
These properties; yellowness, fusibility, malleability,
etc.
,
constitute the nominal essence of gold. However, the
fact that a parcel of matter manifests these properties is
the result of its having a certain internal organization.
That organization is its real essence. "The real essence
is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body,
on which those qualities and all other properties of gold
23depend. " It happens that we do not know what this con-
stitution of insensible parts is. Since they are insens-
ible, they are unknown. Locke sometimes suggests that
scientists are com.ing closer to understanding the real es-
sences of things. We can, I think, suppose that he had
something like atomic structure in mind. In any event,
certain sensible properties of a parcel of matter consti-
tute its nominal essence, and certain insensible properties
constitute its real essence, and the former depend upon or
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derive from the latter in some unspecified way.
Though the real essences of substances are in some
sense more fundamental than the nominal essences, they
nevertheless appear to be had contingently by parcels of
matter: "particular beings, considered barely in themselves,
will be found to have all their qualities equally essenti-
ally: and everything in each individual will be essential
to it; or which is more, nothing at all,"^^ and "there is
^^^i^idual parcel of matter to which any of these quali-
ties are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable
from It." Surely, in stating this extreme inessentialist
doctrine, Locke was going beyond the bounds of his own
theory. A mass of matter must have, one would think, the
property of being composed of two or more atoms, the prop-
erty of having some internal organization or other, and
various similar properties as well. I do not think Locke
would wish to deny that. Rather, he ought to have said
that any particular real essence is not essential, or had
necessarily, by any mass of matter. If the insensible
parts of a parcel of matter having one real essence are re-
arranged, then it may have a different real essence.
The expected theory of persistence . One might expect that
a philosopher holding a view such as this would have the
following to say concerning persistence. Individual sub-
stances, pieces of gold, cars, pens, are masses of matter
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whose parts are arranged la certain ways. In order that a
particular piece of gold i<(,u:sist, a mass of matter must
satisfy the persistence Ci iterion for masses of matter, and
it must retain whatever iiit.ernal constitution is specific
to gold. If the mass of matter loses that particular in-
ternal constitution, it does not cease to exist, it simply
ceases to have the properly of being gold (and various
others as well). Masses mf matter can "out persist" the
individual substances they happen to be at any given time;
thus, the persistence criterion for masses of matter will
be weaker than that of any individual substances.
A problem for the expecto
.l theory. The theory that Locke
actually proposed does not have this feature, however.
After presenting his persistence criterion for masses of
matter, he says.
In the state of living creatures, their identity
depends not on a mass of the same particles, but
on something else. I'or in them the variation in
great parcels of matter alters not the identity:
an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and
then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt
grown up to a horse, sometimes fat and sometimes
lean, is all the while' the saiTie horse: though in
both these cases, thci o may be a manifest change
of parts; so that truly they are not either of
them the same ma^sses matter, though they be
truly one of them the same oak, and the other the
same horse. The rea:uni whereof is, that in these
two cases---a mass of r.', a tter and a living body
—
identity is not applied to the same thingT'2l3~
V-Je had suggested t hat a theory of persistence con-
sistent with Locke's view-: about the ontological primacy
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of masses of matter would be one such that the persistence
criteria for individual substances are subsumable under the
persistence criteria for masses of matter. This much is
clear: taking "living things" to be organisms, organism.s do
not have to meet the persistence requirements that must be
met by masses of matter. At first sight, one might think
that Locke intended his views concerning masses of matter
to apply only to inorganic things. There are two main dif-
ficulties with this suggestion. One is that there is no
textual evidence for this. In fact, tliere is much evidence
to the contrary. In the course of his discussion of real
and nominal essences, he refers equally to gold, men,
sheep, iron, etc. Furthermore, adding the restriction re-
ferred to earlier, Locke's entire doctrine centers around
the assumption that the things having the properties that
constitute either a real or a nominal essence do not have
those properties essentially. On the supposition that
masses of matter are the things having real and nominal
essences, this doctrine is at least initially intelligible.
As Locke said.
So if it be asked, whether it be essential to me
or any other particular corporeal being, to have
reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential
to this white thing I write on to have words on
it. 27
This implies that there is something that survives the loss
of rationality. The thing that survives is not any longer
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a man, but a corporeal being having an internal constitu-
tion requisite to its being something other than a man.
Strictly speaking, then, there should be just one persis-
tence criterion, that for masses of matter. What we have
called persistence
. criteria for individual substances would
simply state the conditions under which a persisting mass
of matter continues to have the property of being such and
such a substance, e.g., a man, a rock, a horse, etc. The
stringency of Locke's persistence criterion for masses of
matter, however, does not provide the basis for such a
theory. Substances, organic or inorganic, gain and lose
parts, and those parts are, like the substances themselves,
masses of matter. Thus, if Locke's persistence criterion
for masses of matter were the correct one, we would be left
with the conclusion that rocks, horses and the like do not
persist through changes in their parts. Faced with this
problem, it seems that Locke should have reconsidered his
proffered persistence criterion for masses of matter. But
this he did not do.
Two persistence criteria . Rather, as is demonstrated by
the above quoted passage, Locke makes the puzzling claim
that the persistence criterion for organisms is different
from the persistence criterion for masses of matter because
in the two cases, "identity is not applied to the same
thing." They are not different in the weak sense that the
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persistence criteria for organisms are instances of some
general persistence criterion for masses of matter. They
are different in the strong sense that a thing existing at
one time can be the same organism as a thing existing at
another while not being the same mass of matter. The per-
sistence criterion for masses of matter is this:
(P25) X at t is the same mass of matter as y at t ' iff
(i) X at t is a mass of matter; (ii) y at t' is a
mass of matter and (iii) (z) (z is a part of x at
t iff z is a part of y at t*).
Without yet attempting to state the complete persistence
criterion for organisms, at least this much is clear:
(P26) O [x at t is the same organism as y at t' and
(3z) (z is a part of x at t and z is not a part
of y at t ' ) ]
.
3. Locke and Relative Identity
The ellipsis thesis and the relativization thesis . The
fact that Locke proposed different persistence criteria for
masses of matter and organisms is often taken to be evi-
dence for the view that Locke thought identity to be rela-
tive. Peter Geach, for instance, cites Locke as a precur-
sor, and Geach is perhaps the most vehement current de--
fender of relative identity. The view that identity is
relative consists of two major assumptions: (1) what I will
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call the "Ellipsis Thesis" and (2) what David Wiggins calls
the "Relativization Thesis.
The Ellipsis Thesis is this; any identity statement
of the form 'x = y' is elliptical for a statement of the
form 'x
^
y,' where 'f is a sortal or count noun. Geach
puts it this way; "When one says 'x is identical with y,'
this, I hold, is an incomplete expression; it is short for
X the same A as y,' where 'A' represents some count noun
understood from the context of utterance--or else it is
just a vague expression of a half-formed thought.
The Relativization Thesis can be formulated as fol-
lows; 0 (x
^
y and x
^
y and fa and fb and ga and gb)
.
That IS, though a thing a is the same F as a thing b, a may
not be the same G as b, where F and G are replaceable by
sortal predicates or count nouns. The Relativization
Thesis should be distinguished from that which allows cases
of this sort; a is identical to b, and though a is an of-
ficial and b is an official, a is not the same official as
b, where we understand this to be true only because, say, a
is a deputy at t, but not a sheriff at t and b is a sheriff
at t' but not a deputy at t'
,
though b was a deputy at t.
Rather, it is a stronger thesis, one according to which
things may be identical relative to one sortal while fail-
ing to be so relative to another.
The import of these two theses can be illustrated
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in the following way: suppose you hear someone saying that
Black Beauty was owned by Squire Gorden and that Jack was
owned by Jerry and you ask, "Is Black Beauty the same as
Jack?" According to the relative identity view, this ques-
tion has various answers, depending upon which sortal you
are understood to be suppressing in the expression 'the
same as.' if you mean "Is Black Beauty the same horse as
Jack?," then the answer is 'yes.' if you mean "Is Black
Beauty the same mass of matter as Jack?," the answer is
'no.' Relative to some sortals. Black Beauty and Jack are
the same; relative to others, they are not. In order that
Jack and Black Beauty be the same horse, there are certain
properties they must share. In order that they be the same
mass of matter
,
there are certain other properties they
must share. In determining sameness or identity, we must
take into account which sortal is in question. One cannot,
as it were, point to a thing existing at one time and to a
thing existing at some other time, and ask, "Is this the
same thing as that?" For, according to this view, the
question, in effect, makes no sense. There are no unsort-
alized "things" to which one can refer, so one cannot ask
whether things are the same. Rather than say that there is
a thing now on my desk having the properties of being a
book, being a diary, being a collection of pages, etc., we
say that a book is on my desk, a collection of pages is on
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my desk, and so on. It is not clear exactly what relation
the book bears to the collection of pages (perhaps the book
IS the collection of pages, where the 'is' is the 'is of
coraposxtion)
,
but, in any case, there is not a thing that
is both a book and a collection of pages.
li}e
_
case for^_Locke. Thus, when Locke says of the oak and
the horse, "truly they are not either one of them the same
masses of matter
,
though they be truly one of them the same
oak, and the other the same horse, we should take him to
be affirming an instance of the Relativization Thesis. The
persistence criteria for masses of matter and organisms are
different because masses of matter and organisms are dif-
ferent sorts of things
. Further evidence that Locke advo-
cated the viev/ that identity is relative is found in his
assertion that, "such as is the idea belonging to that
name, such must be the identity. " For this reason, it is
one thing to be the same substance
,
another the same man,
and a third the same person, if person
,
man and substance
are three names standing for three different ideas. If
indeed Locke believed that identity is relative, then it
should come as no surprise that we find him giving differ-
ent persistence criteria for different sorts of things.
A problem for the case: the ontological primacy of atoms
and masses of matter . While ascribing to Locke the rela-
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tive Identity view helps to explain these passages, it is
not clear that it sheds any light on our initial diffi-
culty; the relationship between the persistence criteria
for masses of matter and organisms given that masses of
matter are ontologically prior to organisms. If Locke is
indeed an adherent of the relative identity view, then we
must take him, as has been noted, as holding that the per-
sistence criteria are different because masses of matter
and organisms are different things. To take his example of
a horse, for instance, we cannot say that there is one
thing having various properties among them that of being a
mass of matter essentially and a horse accidentally.
Rather, we must say there are many things, among them a
mass of matter and a horse. We cannot then say that a
horse and a mass of matter are related in that a horse is
a mass of matter with the internal organization requisite
to its being a horse.
The matter of interpretation is further complicated
by the fact that masses of matter do play an important role
in the persistence criterion Locke attempts to give for an
oak. Though he doesn't suggest that for one oak to be the
same a particular mass of matter must retain the internal
organization requisite to oaks, he does say, "That being
then one plant which has such an organization of parts in
one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it contin-
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ues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same
life, though that life be communicated to new particles of
matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like con-
tinued organization conformable to that sort of plants.
This passage suggests that the persistence of an organism
of a certain kind depends upon a succession of masses of
matter sharing and maintaining whatever internal organiza-
tion is requisite to organisms of that kind. While we will
postpone for the moment an attempt at making this sugges-
tion more clear, it should be apparent that the relative
identity view does not readily accommodate a theory accord-
ing to which organisms are masses of matter. That is, the
relative identity view, while allowing that an acorn and a
grov/n tree are the same oak but not the same mass of matter,
cannot admit that the oak is a mass of matter. While
Locke's persistence criterion for masses of matter is in-
consistent with the view that there is some one persisting
mass of matter that is the oak, his persistence criterion
for oaks requires that, at each moment of the oak's exis-
tence, there is some mass of matter that is the oak. An
adequate interpretation of Locke should take account of
this feature of his theory.
Another problem for the case: the role of the principles of
identity and diversity . Another difficulty that arises in
attributing the relative identity view to Locke is that of
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explaining away the fact that when Locke presented his
principles concerning spatia]. location and beginnings of
existence, he gave no hint that identity can only be de-
termined relative to some sortal. Recall that he says,
"Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the
very being of things, when, considering anything as exist-
ing at any determined time and place
,
we compare it with
itself existing at another time
,
and thereon form the ideas
of identity and diversity . " There is no suggestion here
that in comparing a thing at one time with itself at
another, v/e are thinking of it only as being the same F as
itself. All of Locke's principles are readily formulable
in terms of strict identity, and, in fact, it is hard to
imagine how they v/ould accommodate the strictures of rela-
tive identity. Douglas Odegard takes note of this fact and
attempts to argue that relative identity and ordinary
3 6Leibniz identity are compatible. This is an ambitious
undertaking. Barring examples of the 'same official'
variety, the incompatibility of the Relativization Thesis
and Leibniz identity appears to be undeniable. According
to Leibniz identity, a and b are identical just in case
they share all their properties. According to the Relati-
vization Thesis, however, a can have the property of being
the same F as b, but not the same G, though surely b has
both the property of being the same F as b and that of
61
being the same G as b. How then does Odegard propose to
show that this is only an apparent incompatibility?
Odegard 's solution
. Odegard indeed recognizes where the
purported incompatibility lies, and so he hopes to demon-
strate that while the truth of 'a
^
b' entails the truth
of 'a = b,' the truth of 'a
^
b' does not entail the truth
of 'a b.' By way of arguing for this, Odegard asks us
to accept a stipulated use for 'same corpus' such that a
and b are the same corpus if all their parts are the same
for same body' such that a and b can be the same body
without having all the same parts. He then says, "Thus,
the body I have now and the body I had as a baby are the
same body but not the same corpus. According to Odegard,
we can infer from the fact that his current body is the
same body as his infant body that his current body and his
infant body are, as he puts it, the same individual. That
is, from the fact that a ~ b it follows that a = b, where,
though Odegard is not clear about this, a is replaced by
"Odegard 's infant body" and b by "Odegard 's current body."
Now, we might be inclined to think that we can in-
fer that a ^ b from a
^
b, in which case v/e would have re-
vealed the incompatibility of the Relativization Thesis and
Leibniz identity. We are wrong, says Odegard, because
'a
^
b' has a number of implications, including
'a is a corpus,' 'b was a corpus,' 'a = b' and
'a and b have exactly the same parts.
'
Thus
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a g b' which can be read in such a way that it
thing presupposed or otherwise im-plied by 'a Q b' is false, is equivalent to thedisjunction '~(a = b) v ~ (a is a corpus) v ~ (b
was a corpus) V ~ (a and b have exactly the sameparts)
. .
.
' and is true is any one disjunct is
true. -5 0
For this reason, he "can assert 'a
^
b' on the grounds that
a and b do not have the same parts, without having to
sacrifice 'a = b.'"^^
Odegard's mistake
. Let us examine Odegard's proposal more
carefully. Consistent with Odegard's line of reasoning,
the fact that Odegard's infant body
^
Odegard's current
body has the following implications:
(i) Odegard's infant body has parts x, y, z at t^
(where is some time during Odegard's infancy),
(ii) Odegard's current body has parts q, r, s at t^
(where t^ is some recent or present time and
q, r, s are distinct from x, y, z) .
(iii) Odegard's infant body = Odegard's current body.
From Leibniz' Law and (iii)
,
we can infer:
(iv) Odegard's infant body has parts q, r, s at t^.
and (v) Odegard's current body has parts x, y, z at t^.
But, now, Odegard asks us to suppose that the fact that
Odegard's infant body
^
Odegard's current body is a result
of the fact that Odegard's infant body and Odegard's cur-
rent body fail to have the same parts. That is:
(vi) 'N/ Odegard's infant body has parts q, r, s at t^.
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(vii) Odegard's current body has parts q, r, s at t
c
’
However, it immediately becomes clear where the trouble
lies. If Odegard wants to avoid "sacrificing" the truth of
(iii)
,
he cannot affirm that (vi) is true. For (vi) clear-
ly contradicts (iv)
,
which was an implication of (iii) to-
gether with Leibniz' Law. Odegard's mistake, I think, lies
in his failure to recognize that in order to interpret the
expression (a and b have exactly the same parts)" in such
a way that it does not contradict 'a = b, ' one must take
account of the fact that at any single time, a and b must
have the same parts. If they don't, then they simply aren't
Identical. In short, we must conclude that a thing cannot
be identical to another by one criterion of identity, and
fail to be so on another. To suggest otherwise is to deny
the truth of Leibniz' Law.
Since Locke's initial discussion of identity is
most plausibly construed as being about strict identity,
and his subsequent discussion is thought to be about rela-
tive identity, it is understandable that Odegard hoped to
show that the two do not exclude one another. We have seen,
hov;ever, that a person cannot consistently affirm both
doctrines
.
4. An Alternative Account of Locke's
Theory of Persistence
A sketch of the theory . I think it is possible to recon-
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struct Locke's views in such a way that the charge of in-
consistency can be avoided. Furthermore, a view of iden-
tity can be attributed to Locke which is more in keeping
with other aspects of his philosophical system. The pro-
posal is this: at the beginning of Locke's chapter on
identity
,
we should take him to be stating identity cri-
teria for what he sometimes called 'real existences '
--atoms,
masses of atoms, finite spirits and god. Later in the
chapter, rather than suppose him to be talking about the
need to relativize identity, we should take him to be de-
scribing the relation that must hold between masses of
matter in order that they constitute a persisting substance
of a particular sort. For each sort, there v;ill be one
such relation. This persisting substance is, in some sense,
'less real' thaii the mass of matter that constitutes it.
In attempting to attribute to Locke a unified
theory of persistence, we ran into various difficulties.
Locke's views about the ontological primacy of atoms and
masses of matter in conjunction with his persistence cri-
terion for masses of matter was not reconcilable with his
persistence criteria for living things (and, we supposed,
for inorganic things as well) . The supposition that Locke
thought identity to be relative serves only as a partial
conciliator; for on that view, the ontological status of
atoms and masses of matter remains a problem and v/e have no
65
recourse but to dismiss Locke's apparent adherence to or-
dinary Leibniz identity. Our proposed alternative has an
advantage over its competitors in that it endorses strict
identity
,
provides a reading of the relative identity pas-
sages consistent with the endorsement of strict identity
and accommodates the ontological status assigned to masses
of matter.
The status of atoms and masses of matter . We have already
seen some of the evidence for thinking that Locke held
atoms and masses of matter to be the ontologically funda-
rnsntal entities. Masses or parcels of matter are the
things that have real and nominal essences. Nominal es-
sences are "the standards to rank real existences into
sorts, as they agree with these patterns and to denominate
them accordingly." Whether or not a parcel of matter is
to qualify as belonging to a particular species is, we
might say, a matter of convention. The following passage
from Locke indicates the sense in which he took this to be
true:
It is evident that men make sorts of things.
For it being different essences alone that make
different species, it is plain that they who make
those abstract i^eas which are the nominal es-
sences do thereby make the species, or sort.
Should there be a body found, having all the
other qualities of gold except malleableness, it
would no doubt be made a question whether it were
gold or not, i.e., whether it were of that species.
This could be determined only by that abstract
idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so
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that It would be true gold to him, and belong tothat species, who included not malleableness inhis nominal essence, signified by the sound gold;
and on the other side it would not be true gold,
or of that species, to him who included malle-
ableness in his specific idea.'^l
The internal organization of a particular mass of
matter ultimately determines its membership in a particular
species, though the nominal essence contains only sensible
properties. it seem.s reasonable to suppose that the nomin-
al essence of, for instance, the species horse not only in-
such properties as being four — legged, being a mam-
mal, etc.
,
but also that of being such that it can gain and
lose parts. It is, as Locke would put it, part of our idea
of a horse that it is something capable of gaining and
losing parts. Presumably, the determination that such a
property is contained in the nominal essence of horses is
as much a matter of convention as the determination that
malleableness is nominally essential to gold.
Since the possession of a particular real essence
qualifies a mass of matter for membership in a particular
species, we can say that a horse, for instance, begins to
exist when a mass of matter takes on the organization re-
quisite to horses. Under what circumstances does that par-
ticular horse continue to exist? Given the persistence
criterion for masses of matter, we must say that the horse
continues to exist after the particular mass of matter in
which it began ceases to exist. "Real existences" are
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subject to the identity criteria laid out by Locke at the
beginning of his chapter on identity. We suggested that
these were designed to serve as epistemic criteria, though
they seem to be of limited utility. They hold, says Locke,
"of every particle of matter, to which no addition or sub-
traction of matter is made."*^^ This coincides with his
later statement of the persistence criterion for masses of
matter, which we formulated in (P25) . Real identity goes
hand in hand with real existences.
The status of organisms . The "less real" things, the
things that are "made by men,"^^ go hand in hand with some-
thing less than identity, something that, too, is made by
men. Locke's discussion of the persistence criterion for
organisms is less than perspicacious; nevertheless it gives
us some idea what he had in mind. A crucial feature of
organisms, as we have seen, is the possession of some real
essence or internal organization. Using the example of a
plant, Locke says.
For this organization, being at any one instant
in any one collection of matter, is in that parti-
cular concrete distinguished from all other, and
that individual life, which existing constantly
from that moment both forwards and backwards, in
the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts
united to the living body of the plant, it has that
identity which makes the same plant, and all the
parts of it, parts of the S6ime plant, during all the
time that they exist united in that continued or-
ganization, which is fit to convey that common life
to all the parts so united.
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The following seems to capture the intent of this
passage: On Day 1, the parts of a mass of matter come to be
arranged in the manner requisite to a particular sort of
plant. Let us, for simplicity's sake, suppose there are
three parts A, B and C and let us say that the arrangement
requisite to the particular sort of plant can be described
as a three-place relation holding amongst the parts A, B
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and C. VJe will call that relation 0. On Day 2, A ac-
quires some new matter. A ceases to be and A' comes into
being. Now, A'
,
B and C stand in relation 0. The mass of
^^tter whose parts stand in relation 0 on Day 2 is thus a
different mass of matter from that whose parts stood in re-
lation O on Day 1. On Day 3, B acquires some new matter,
so B ceases to exist and B' takes its place. Again, 0 re-
mains constant. We can imagine this process continuing in-
definitely. Finally, it might well be the case that none
of the original matter remains. Nevertheless, if the new
parts continue to stand in 0, the same plant remains.
The various masses of matter that successively pos-
sess the property of having parts that stand in relation 0
must in turn bear certain relations to one another. Chis-
holm's notion of "one compositum evolving from another"
seems to be on the same track. A compositum, for Chisholm,
is simply a thing having parts that is subject to Locke's
persistence criterion for masses of matter:
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Let us say that a given compositum N direct-ly evolves from a certain compositum A provided
the following condition holds: N and A have some
parts in common; and N is that compositum whichdirectly results either from rearranging parts of
A, or from adding parts of A or from removing
parts of A. . . . if N is identical with A, then
N was evolved from A, and A has evolved from N.'^^
This analysis of direct evolution seems to specify
adequately the relation that A', B, C bears to A, B, C.
But what of the relation that A’, B', C bears to A, B, C?
Here we can appeal to Chisholm's analysis of evolution: "a
composition N evolves from a compositum A, provided that:
N is a member of every class C such that (1) A is a member
of C and (2) v;hatever directly evolves from anything that
is a member of C is also a member of C."^^
Borrowing from Chisholm, and stipulating that a
mass of matter has an 0-property if its parts bear 0 to
one another (a further restriction will be added shortly)
,
we can formulate the following persistence criterion for
organisms
:
(P27) m at t constitutes the same organism as m' at t'
iff (i) m is a mass of matter; (ii) m.' is a mass
of matter (iii) m' evolved from m and (iv) (30)
(0 is an 0-property and m has 0 at t and m' has 0
at t' and any thing that evolves from m and from
which m' evolves also has O)
.
For each kind of organism, there will be some organization-
al property unique to it. In Lockean terms, the organize-
tional property is the real essence of the thing. it is
reasonable to suppose that (P27) will hold of inorganic
things as well; in fact, it will hold of those things about
which we say that they can persist through changes in their
parts. For want of a better term, we can call such things
"Lockean objects," where we understand the term in such a
way that it picks out Lockean sorts of things
:
pieces of
horses, plants, watches and the like. With respect
to each of these, there will be an 0-property and so we get
a generalized version of (P27)
:
(P28) m at t constitutes the same Lockean object as m
at t' iff (i) m is a mass of matter; (ii) m' is
a mass of matter; (iii) m' evolved from m; and
(iv) (30) (0 is an 0-property and m has 0 at t
and m ' has 0 at t
'
)
.
Lockean objects . What exactly is a Lockean object? Per-
haps it is best construed as a set whose members are masses
of matter each of which possesses the 0-property unique to
objects of a particular kind. If the set consists of
masses m^ . . . m^, then m
2
directly evolved from m^^ and m^
directly evolved from m
2
and so on. Since it is a matter
of convention which properties make up the nominal essence
of a thing and through the possession of a certain 0-
property results in a mass of matter having certain sen-
sible properties that make up the nominal essence of a
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particular kind of plant, it might well have been the case
that we had chosen other properties for the nominaD. es-
sence. Had we done so, then that set of masses of matter
would not qualify as a plant of that kind.
Thus, for every nominal essence there is some 0-
property unique to it. However, it is not the case that
for every 0-property, there is some nominal essence unique
to it. It might be the case that there is a set of evolv-
ing masses of matter, each member of which possesses some
O—property
,
and yet there is no nominal essence correspond-
ing to that 0-property
. We should not want such a set to
qualify as a Lockean object. Thus, we should understand
the term '0-property' in a more restricted way: a thing has
an 0-property just in case its parts bear 0 to one another
and there is some nominal essence corresponding to C.
(This more restrictive specification of an 0-property
should be used in (P27) and (P28) as well.) We can then
define a Lockean object in this way:
(P29) K is a Lockean object iff (i) K is a set <m^ . . .
m^^ . . . of masses of matter; (ii) (30) (O is
an 0-property and (m) (Me K m has 0) ; (iii) (i)
(1 £ i £ n —> directly evolved from or m^^ =
m^^) .
Lockean objects are "less real," perhaps, for two
reasons: (1) we do not ordinarily- think of physical objects
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as being sets and (2) the fact that there is some nominal
essence corresponding to O is a matter of convention.
^he application of Locke's theory to the problem of the
Ship of Theseus
. (P28) may supply us with an answer to the
puzzle involving our various ships. We had two candidates:
(1) the ship that was crowned with garlands in 399 B.C.
The garlanded ship based its claim on that fact that it was
the result of a gradual replacement of planks. (2) the
ship of the Hobbesian man. The Hobbesian ship based its
claim on the fact that it shared its planks with the ori-
ginal ship. On Locke's criterion, which ship is the same
ship as the ship Theseus sailed to Crete? Well, it might
be thought that, again, both ships have equal claim. Given
our definition of evolving, isn't it the case that each of
the masses of matter that constitute each ship can be said
to have evolved from the mass of matter that constituted
Theseus ' ship? And that each of them has the relevant O-
property? Perhaps not. Recall Locke's principles concern-
ing beginnings of existence (P23) and (P24). According to
them, one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence.
On our new interpretation of Locke, we take these princi-
ples to apply only to real existences. Masses of matter
are real existences. With respect to the Hobbesian ship,
it might be claimed, the mass of matter that constitutes
it is the very same mass of matter that constituted the
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original ship. So, by our definition of evolving, the
former can be said to have evolved from the latter. How-
ever, given Locke's persistence criterion for masses of
matter, it should be clear that as soon as the first plank
was lemoved from the original ship, the mass of matter that
constituted the ship went out of existence. And, given
Locke's principles about the beginnings of existence, it
might be said that very same mass of matter could not come
back into existence again. So, the two masses of matter
are not identical and so the one cannot be said to have
evolved from the other. On the other hand, it is perhaps
better to interpret Locke's principles concerning the be-
ginnings of existence in such a way that though the mass of
matter that constituted the original ship went out of
existence with the removal of the first plank, and though
it did not have a new beginning of existence when reas-
sembled by the Hobbesian man, it was reintroduced by the
Ilobbesian man. Thus, the very same mass of matter, after a
series of intermediate evolvings
,
existed once again. How-
ever, it should be clear that not every mass of matter that
evolved from the original ship and from which the ship of
the Hobbesian man evolved had the requisite 0-property.
Presumably, the 0-property that confers plankhood upon a
mass of matter is not the same as the 0-property that con-
fers shiphood on a mass of matter-. Thus, we seem to be
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left with the conclusion that the garlanded ship has won
the battle.
assessment of the theory
. Clearly, (P28) is not a per-
sistence principle in the sense that a persistence prin-
ciple states the conditions under which things existing at
different times are identical. There is no identity here,
only an 0-property that is exemplified by evolving masses
of matter. But this should be seen as an advantage by the
Lockean interpreter. We have an analysis that preserves
the ontological priority of masses of matter and does not
force us to abandon Leibniz identity altogether. Further-
more, it allows us to maintain a version of the Relativiza-
tion Thesis. According to our interpretation of Locke,
statements of the form 'a is the same F as b' are to be
interpreted as 'a constitutes the same F as b, ' where 'a'
and b stand for masses of matter, and 'F' for some kind
of object. Thus "a is the same ship as b" is to be inter-
preted as "the mass of matter a constitutes the same ship
as the mass of matter b." If we suppose that a thing con-
stitutes itself, then this reading holds even when we re-
place 'F' by 'mass of matter,' though masses of matter are
not objects in the Lockean sense. In any event, we can now
understand statements such as "m is the same ship as m' but
not the same mass of matter" as meaning "m constitutes the
same ship as m' but m does not constitute the same mass of
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matter as m'." Though the second conjunct amounts to the
denial of "m = m'," the first is not equivalent to the
affirmation of "m = m'."
Statements of the form 'a = b' should be inter-
preted in the following way: if such a statement asserts
the identity of masses of matter existing at different
times, tnen it is true just in case the masses of matter
satisfy Locke's persistence criterion. If, on the other
hand, the statement asserts something like 'the ship
Theseus sailed to Crete is identical to the ship that was
crowned with garJands in 399 B.C.' (or makes any assertion
to the effect that Lockean objects existing at different
times are identical), then the statement is false, except,
where, as is not often the case, the relevant masses of
matter happen to be identical.
Our interpretation has its disadvantages, however,
for those interested in determining the truth about per-
sistence. It is not clear that masses of matter should be
accorded the high ontological status given them by Locke,
and it is not clear just v;hat the ontological status of ob-
jects is supposed to be. Furthermore, the theory depends
on the viability of various troublesome concepts. As we
will see in the next chapter, the concept of evolution, for
instance, resists a coherent formulation.
Our interpretation of Locke does nevertheless
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provide us with a general strucl.ure that some philosophers
have found useful in attempting Lo deal with the problem of
persistence. The general strucl.ure is this: There is only
one "kind" of identity, namely, Leibniz identity. Leibniz
Identity does not hold between physical objects existing at
different times, but rather some other relation or rela-
tions hold. These relations hold amongst things that con-
stitute, stand in for, do duty for, physical objects. They
are, in a sense, more real than physical objects. Our talk
about physical objects can be "reduced" to talk about the
relations holding amongst these things, in particular our
talk about t.he persistence of physical objects through
changes in the.ir parts. Chisholm, the most vigorous con-
temporary defender of this sort of position, has attempted
to work about the details of such a view. We can judge the
adequacy of his theory only by determining the extent to
which he is successful in working out its details and by
determining whether the theory billows some room for ac-
commodating our ordinary intuitions about physical objects,
in particular about their persistence.
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CHAPTER III
CHISHOLM ON PERSISTENCE
1. The Early Account
Bishop Bu iaer's thesis
. Chisholm's first published attempt
to deal with the problem of the Ship of Theseus and others
like it occurs in his paper "The Loose and Popular and the
Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity."^ There, he
offers his own formulation and defense of Bishop Butler's
thesis that "when we say of a physical thing existing at
one time that it is identical with, or the same as, a
physical tiling existing at some other time ('this is the
same ship we traveled in before')," we are using the expres-
sion 'the same as' or 'identical with' in a 'loose and
popular sense.
' But when we say of a person existing at
some other time ('the ship has the same captain it had be-
fore')
,
we are using 'the same as' or 'identical with' in
a 'strict and philosophical sense.
Quine's doctrine of temporal parts . Before attempting to
explain w’hat Chisholm's (or Butler's) theory is, we should
be clear as to what he claims it isn't. Chisholm offers a
brief discussion of Quine views on Heraclitus' river prob-
lem. Heraclitus, it seems, contended that one cannot bathe
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the oame river twice since new waters are always flow-
3 ^ing in. Presumably, this runs counter to our ordinary
intuitions about rivers and bathing, since, as is the case
with ships and cars, we ordinarily assume that rivers can
change (e.g., waters) and yet remain the same river.
Quine s solution to this problem is that we view rivers
(and other physical things) as processes through time.
These processes have 'temporal parts' that are 'stages' of
a thing. "The truth is that you can bathe in the same
river twice, but not in the same river stage.
Now, Chisholm is prepared to concede to Quine a
part of this view, but argues that the theory, taken in its
entirety, lacks the explanatory power that Quine attributes
to it. Chisholm's concession is to the notion that per-
sisting things have temporal parts, "I think we may say,
though we need not say, that those things that persist
through time are made up of temporal parts. Clearly,
this is a minor concession since Chisholm goes on to say
that he thinks it is a "category mistake" to say that a
physical object is itself a process or event. However,
Chisholm has what he takes to be a decisive cricitism of
Quine's view, namely, that in trying to solve the problem
of persistence through change by replacing persisting ob-
jects v/ith sums of temporal stages, Quine presupposes the
concept of persistence through time. That is, since not
82
all sums of river stages are rivers (e.g., the Nile from
9 to 10 A.M., the Connecticut from 11 to 12 A.M. and the
Hudson from 1 to 2 P.M.), something more is required for a
sum of river stages to yield a river. That something, it
seems, must be a persisting thing. "We could say, of
course, that river stages a, b, c, occurring or existing at
different times, are stages of the same river if and only
if there is an x such that x is a river and such that a, b,
c, are stages of x."^ This clearly presupposes the concept
of a river persisting through time. If we choose as our
reference point some other physical thing, say a river bed,
or river banks
,
we are again presupposing the concept of a
physical object persisting through time.
We could, then, move to some other ontological
category and say, for instance, that
given the concept of a person persisting through
time, we might be able to define a persisting river
in terms of river stages and accessibility to his
observations. Or . .
.
given the concept of a
P-^ace persisting through time, we could say that a
sum of river stages makes up a river, provided its
elements all occupy the same place.
^
If we v/ere to do either of these things, however, we could
not expect to define the persistence of a person by refer-
ence to the persistence of his body, nor could we expect
to define the persistence of a place in terms of the per-
sistence of the physical things occupying it. It is worth-
while to mention these last points of Chisholm's since they
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hint at what he takes to be at least one criterion of an
adequate solution to the problems of Heraclitus and his
river and Theseus and his ship. in attempting to solve
these problems by eliminating the concept of physical ob-
ject persistence, one must not presuppose it. Furthermore,
it seems clear from Chisholm's statement about temporal
parts that he views them as providing little in the way of
philosophical utility. ^ something persists through time,
then we can, if we choose, talk about the temporal parts of
it, but presumably everything we might want to say about it
can be said without reference to its temporal parts. And
it is best to avoid talk of temporal parts since in doing
so we may be misled into thinking that they provide a solu-
. Qtion to the problem of persistence.
Compos it
a
. What, then, is Chisholm's solution, as pre-
sented in "Senses of Identity," to the problem of persis-
tence? Chisholm first asks us to consider the things he
calls "composita." A compositum is "anything that has a
part, in other words, if A is a compositum, then there is
9something B such that B is a part of A." Despite the
vagueness of the term 'part,' we can say that the relation
'part of' is transitive, asymmetric and, according to Chis-
holm, everything that is a part of something is such that
there is some other thing that is a part of it. The fol-
lowing illustration will prove useful in our discussion.
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Figure 1.
The picture in Figure 1 represents a compositum,
though at this point we need not say anything more about
what it represents. This compositum, let us call it
Hansel, is composed of just x, y and z. It is composed
other things that, in turn, are composed of just x, y
and z. For instance, it is composed of that compositum
xy, which is x together with y. And it is composed of yz,
that compositum which is y together with z. According to
Chisholm, however, the thing (if there be such a thing) xz
that is composed of x and z is not a part of Hansel, for it
is not a compositum but is rather a mere con j unctivum.
Thus, xz is not a compositum for x and z are not "joined
together." (Chisholm offers no criterion by means of which
composita can be distinguished from mere conjunctiva. His
examples of composita involve things v/hose parts are fast-
ened together in some way. But it is clear that we are to
rely on our intuitioiis in this matter.)
To understand in what way Hansel is composed of, or
made up of x, y, z, however, Chisholm offers the following
principles of composition which are analogous to the con-
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cept of a decomposition introduced earlier :
(Cl) A is. entirely distinct from B provided there is
no X such that x is a part of A and x is also a
part of B.
(C2) A is composed of B and C provided: B is a part of
A; C is part of A; B is entirely distinct from C;
there is no part of A that is entirely dis~
tinct from both B and from
Thus, Hansel is composed of x, y and z because x, y and z
are entirely distinct from one another and no part of
Hansel is entirely distinct from x, y and z.
Mon Tut Wed Thu Pri 5ad: Sun
Figure 2.
Figure 2 represents what Chisholm calls an 'evolving system
12
of composita. ' The change from (1) to (2) involves the
removal of a part, x. The change from (2) to (3) involves
the addition of a part w. The change from (2) to (3)
causes a new compositum, that composed of w, z, and y, to
come into being. This process continues through Sunday.
The concepts of evolution and direct evolution. Having
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presented some important features of these things he calls
composita, Chisholm then asks the following question, "What
relation must obtain between two different composita if
they go to make up the same physical thing?"^^ After all,
our initial concern was with the persistence conditions for
things like ships and, so far, we have discussed only com-
posita. Chisholm's answer, briefly stated, is that in
order for the ship we see today to be the same ship as the
ship v/e saw yesterday, the compositum we see today must
have evolved from the compositum we saw yesterday. Fig-
ure 2 represents a case of evolution. Chisholm character-
izes direct evolution this way:
(PI) A composition N directly evolves from a composi-
tion A iff (i) N and A have parts in common; (ii)
N is that compositum which directly results either
from rearranging parts of A, or from adding parts
of A, or from removing parts from A; or N is
14identical to A.
Thus, referring to Figure 2, we see that compositum (2)
directly evolves from compositum (1) and compositum (3)
directly evolves from compositum (2)
.
Compositum (3)
,
pro-
viding the 'or' in (PI)
,
is not the exclusive 'or,
'
also
directly evolves from compositum (1) . The same holds true
of the relation between compositum (1) and every other com-
positum until we get to compositum (7)
.
Compositum (7)
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shares no parts with compositum (1), so it cannot be said
to directly evolve from compositum (1) . Each of then, of
course, directly evolves from itself. As Chisholm notes,
it is often the case that when we encounter a ship on two
different occasions, the compositum we encounter as the
second has not directly evolved from the compositum we en-
countered on the first. For instance, supposing that, as
Chisholm puts it, in seeing a ship, we see first compositum
(1) and then, later, v/e see compositum (7), we will not
have seen two composite, one of which directly evolved from
the other. Rather, (7) can be said merely to have evolved
from (1). Evolution, as distinct from direct evolution, is
as follows:
(P2) A compositum. N evolves from a compositum A iff
N is a member of every class C such that: (i) A
is a member of C and (ii) whatever directly
evolves from anything that is a member of C is
15
also a member of C.
Chisholm's concept of evolution is based on Frege's defi-
X 6
nition of the ancestral relation. Mr. Jones is an an-
cestor of Mr. Schwartz provided that Mr. Jones is a member
of every class having as members Mr. Schwartz, Mr.
Schwartz's parents, their parents, their parents' parents,
and so on. There will be more than one such class, since
there are ancestral classes whose, members include Mr.
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Schwartz and his sister Ms. Schwartz, or Mr. Jones and his
friend Mr. Fork.
constitution
. How exactly does Chisholm use
the concept of evolution to develop his theory of loose and
popular persistence? \le have seen that he assumes that, in
order that it be the case that we encounter the same ship
on two different occasions, the compositum we encountered
in the second must have evolved from the compositum we en-
countered on the first. That, he says, is a necessary, but
not sufficient condition for sameness of ship. We want to
know what it is for two different composita to make up or,
as Chisholm puts it, "constitute" the same ship.
Utilizing Webster's definition of a ship ("a struc-
ture used for transportation in water"), Chisholm suggests
the following principle concerning the sameness of ships:
(P3) Two composita, A and N, constitute the same ship
iff (i) A is a structure used for transportation
in water; (ii) N is a structure used for transpor-
tation in water; and (iii) every compositum B such
that B evolved from A and N evolved from B was also
17
a structure used for transportation in water.
Two points about ships . Chisholm now makes what he calls
"two rather different" points about the expression "the
same ship." (i) He concedes that (P3) is "not entirely
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satisfactory. He reasons as follows; not everything that
qualifies as a ship is a structure used for transportation
in water. Some ships are used merely as models or as deco-
rations, or simply never set sail at all. But we will
never arrive at an entirely adequate characterization be-
cause the expression "the same ship" is defeasible
. This
meaus that "v/here there is a question of applicability, the
proper authorities may lay down a convention, a convention
which is itself neither true nor false and which therefore
cannot be contradicted by any actual state of affairs.
(ii) "The average Englishman" is, according to
Chisholm, a logical construction. So, too, is "the same
ship. " Just as talk about the average Englishman can be
"reduced" to talk about particular Englishmen, so can talk
about persisting physical things be reduced to talk about
the various composita that make them up. "The ship is 'an
accident' of the various composita that served to make it
,,19
up.
The solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus
. Final-
ly, it will be recalled that Chisholm began by suggesting
that the problem of the Ship of Theseus and others like it
could be solved by showing that a physical thing existing
at one time and a physical thing existing at another are
identical only in a 'loose and popular sense.' Now, ac-
cording to Chisholm, we have the machinery requisite to
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explaining just what that means. He presents the follov/ing
. 20diagram
:
A
B
C D
E F
Figure 3.
Figure 3 represents evolving composita. The compositum A
is the one that was first launched. It evolved into B,
which in turn evolved into both C and D. C evolved into E,
and D into F. Tv;o people might engage in the following
dispute. One claims that the ship on the left is identical
to the one originally launched. The other claims that the
ship on the right is identical to the one originally
launched. How are we to judge the dispute? Chisholm say;
The following points seem to me clear. (1) Com-
positum E is not identical with compositum F; (2)
compositum E is not identical with compositum A;
(3) compositum F is not identical with compositum
A; (4) E and A belong to a system of composita,
namely ABCE, to which F does not belong; (5) F
and A belong to a system of composita, namely
ABDF, to which E does not belong; (6) both E and
F belong to a system of composita, namely ABCDEF,
to which A belongs; and (7) A belongs to a system
of composita, namely AB, to which neither E nor F
belongs
,
Given these points, and given that the disputants agree on
them, their dispute over the question whether the ship on
the left or the ship on the right is identical with the one
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originally launched is a dispute "nierely about words.
The dispute can be settled by agreeing on a set of conven-
tions. If they agree on points (1) through (7), then their
dispute concerns only the loose and popular sense of iden-
tity .
problems with the solution
. Has Chisholm succeeded in
presenting a solution'to the problem of the Ship of Theseus?
It is not clear that he has. Let us begin by examining
(PI) and (P2). One problem with (Pi) is that Chisholm
failed to specify the temporal order of direct evolution.
Referring to Figure 2, we shall have to say that while com-
positum (2) directly evolves from compositum (1), so, too,
does compositum (1) directly evolve from compositum (2).
It is, after all, the result of adding a part, namely x, to
compositum (2). The same holds, mutatis mutandis
,
for com-
posita (2) and (3). The same difficulty will, of course,
spply to (P2)
.
Compositum (2) must be said to evolve
directly from compositum (3)
.
But there are more serious problems, ones that
emerge most clearly when we consider (P3)
.
(P3) tells us
the conditions under which two composite constitute the
same ship. It should first be mentioned that, according
to (P3)
,
any two composite that bear no evolving relations
to one another but are both structures used for transporta-
tion in water will constitute the same ship. Since there
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are no composita that evolved from one and from which the
other evolved, clause (iii) of (P3) will be satisfied.
This rather trivial problem can be remedied by specifying
that the composita in question stand in some evolving re-
lation to one another. We have yet another problem, how-
ever, with (P3)
.
Figure 2 is an attempt to illustrate the sort of
case Chisholm had in mind. But Figure 2 actually repre-
sents only part of the story. There are other evolvings and
direct evolvings (even supposing that the temporal order is
specified) taking place. Not only, for instance, does com-
positum (2) directly evolve from compositum (1), but,
surely, all the parts of compositum (1) (being themselves
composita) directly evolve from compositum (1)
.
M on Tue
Figure 4.
Figure 4 attempts to flesh out part of the picture of evo-
lution represented by Figure 2. In the transition from
Monday to Tuesday, we not only have the direct evolution of
compositum (2) from compositum (1) , but also the direct
evolution of the parts of compositum (1) , the things
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labeled (in Figure 4) , as (2a)
,
(2b)
,
and (2c)
. The same
phenomenon occurs in the transition from Tuesday to Wednes-
day and so on. Now, in order to determine whether composi-
tum (7) (see Figure 2) evolved from compositum (1)
,
we see
whether it is a member of every class which is such that
compositum (1) is a member of that class and whatever di-
rectly evolves from anything that is a member of that class
is also a member of that class. Thus, we construct class
A, which is a class of directly evolving composite:
Class A: {(1), the parts of (1), (2), the parts of (2),
(3)
,
the parts of (3) , . , . (7)
,
the parts of
(7)}.
(P3) tells us that the two composite constitute the same
ship provided that each is a structure used for transporta-
tion in water, and every compositum that evolved from the
"earlier" compositum and from which the "later" compositum
evolved is also a structure used for transportation in
water. Presumably, we want it to be the case that composi-
tum (1) and compositum (7) constitute the same ship. Re-
ferring to Class A, however, we see that the 'evolving sys-
tem' of composite fails to satisfy (P3)
.
Even if we sup-
pose that composita (1) through (7) are structures used for
transportation in water, there are yet members of class A,
and thus composita that evolve from compositum (1) and
from which compositum (7) evolves, that are not themselves
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structures used for transportation in water. The culprits
here are the various parts of coinposita (1) through (7).
The existence of these stray evolvers creates a problem
for (P3)
.
Chisholm's revisj^n: a new definition of dirf^nt
.
Chisholm, himself, in a slightly later version of his first
paper, attempts to deal with this problem, and with the
earlier mentioned one concerning the temporal order of evo-
23lution. It seems that he takes the solution to be that
of ruling out the possibility that the parts of a composi-
tum directly evolve from it.
^ evolves directly from y iff either x is identical
to y or there is no time at which x and y both
exist but there is a z such that z is a part of y
at one time and z is a part of x at a later time.^"^
(P4) does indeed prevent us from saying that, for instance,
that part of compositum (1) we called (2a) directly evolves
from compositum (1) in the transition from Monday to Tues-
day . There is a time at v;hich compositum (1) and composi-
tum (la) both exist, namely, Monday. However, referring to
Figure 2, we see that (P4) also prevents us from saying
that compositum (2) directly evolves from compositum (1)
since there is a time at which they both exist, namely on
Monday. Similarly, compositum (3) does not directly evolve
from compositum (2)
.
It does, however, directly evolve
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from compositum (1), since there is no time at which they
both exist, but they do have parts in common. The same
holds of the relationship between compositum (3) and com-
positum (4). The latter does not directly evolve from the
former though it does directly evolve both from compositum
(2) and from compositum (1)
.
We can focus, then, on two classes of evolving com-
posite. Presumably, the members of these classes form
evolving systems of composite.
Class B: {Comp (1), comp (3), comp (4), comp (5), comp
(6)
,
comp (7) }
.
and another that looks like this;
Class C: (Comp (2), comp (4), comp (5), comp (6), comp
(7)
}.
Class B is that class containing compositum (1) and all
those composite that evolve from it. Compositum (2) is not
a member of Class B since it does not directly evolve from
compositum (1) , nor from any other member of class B.
Class C contains compositum (2) and all those composite
that evolve from it. Compositum (3) isn't a member of
Class C since it does not directly evolve from compositum
(2)
,
nor from any other member of Class C.
The failure of the revised definition . The peculiarity of
(P4) is most clearly brought out when we attempt to imple-
ment Chisholm's principle of ship constitution (P3). V7e
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wanted it to be the case that compos! turn (1) and compositum
(7) constitute the same ship. Presumably, too, compositum
(2) and compositum (7) constitute the same ship. Now, we
have Class B, v;hich can be said to contain the chain of
evolving composita that links compositum (1) and compositum
(7)
.
Class C contains the chain of evolving composita that
links compositum (2) and compositum (7)
.
But it is impor-
tant to notice a fev/ things: the chain linking (1) and (7)
does not include (3). Though we can suppose that composi-
tum (1) constitutes the same ship as does (7)
,
and that (2)
constitutes the same ship as does (7), compositum (1) does
not constitute the same ship as does compositum (2)
,
since
compositum (2) is not a compositum that evolves from (1)
and from which (7) evolves. Compositum (2) neither evolves
nor directly evolves from compositum (1). Thus, (P4) can
be said to yield two unsatisfactory results: (i) with re-
spect to Figure 2, we see that there are strange gaps in
the system of evolvers. The ship that is constituted by
compositum (1) on Monday and compositum (7) on Sunday ap-
pears not to exist on Tuesday, though it exists on all the
other days. The ship that is constituted by compositum (2)
on Tuesday and by compositum (7) on Sunday appears not to
exist on Wednesday, though it exists on the other days.
And finally, it appears that there is a failure of what we
might call the 'transitivity of constitution,' since
97
compositum (1) and compositum (7) constitute the same ship
and compositum (2) and compositum (7) constitute the same
ship, but compositum (1) and compositum (2) do not consti-
tute the same ship.
assessment o£_yTe__e_arly account
. What has gone wrong
here is fairly clear. when Chisholm first proposed his
definition of direct evolution, he seems to have had in
mind the sort of case represented by any two consecutive
pairs in Figure 2. Evidence for this lies in his own il-
lustration, namely, that of a child playing with lettered
blocks
(1) WECA
(2) WEC
(3) WECI
(4) WICE
(5) WECI
Figure 5.
Chisholm, calls this an 'evolving system of composita' and
characterizes it this way, "These various composita, each
of the lower ones being made from the one immediately above
It, exemplify various types of change ..." Thus, when
first introduced, the relation of direct evolution has two
important features: (i) if x directly evolves from y, then
X and y have parts in common and (ii) if x directly evolves
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from y, then y directly results from a change in the parts
of X. The first feature is reasonably straightforward.
The second, however, in conjunction with phenomena such as
that represented in Figure 5, lead one to think that while
WEC directly evolves from V7ECA, WECI does not. Rather, it
directly evolves from WEC. The change from WECA to WEC
involves one change, namely, subtraction of a part. But
the change from WECA to WECI involves two changes, namely,
subtraction and addition. We are led to believe that WECI
does not directly result from a change in V7ECA. Admittedly,
there is an ambiguity in Chisholm's original account of
evolution, (PI)
. We do not know whether we are to take the
'or' in the second clause in its inclusive or exclusive
sense. Chisholm's explanation of Figure 5, however, lends
support to reading it in the exclusive sense.
Now, when Chisholm substitutes (P4) for (PI)
,
the
ambiguity dissolves. (P4) emphasizes only the first fea-
ture of direct evolution, namely, the sharing of parts.
He illustrates the direct evolution of (P4) by means of a
2 8different picture:
AB
BC
FB CJ
FL JH
Figure 6.
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He says.
’evolves' is illustrated
in thTt- IS continuous witli ab
therL?o ^ in coiximon ; we may say,that the latter object BC 'dirLtly'
earlier object AB. Analogous-
CJ In nr
of FB to BC, of FL to FB
,
of
FL direc-l'' °f to AB . And since
evnWoH evolved from something that directly
from AB 2
9°"^ simply that FL evolved
Surely, there is a sense in which the sharing of
parts is the important feature to emphasize. The distinc-
tion between evolution and direct evolution then becomes
one between cases where composita share parts and cases
where they don t share parts but there are part-sharing
composita linking them. That is, presumably, the only dis-
tinction that really needs to be made. The problem, how-
ever, IS that (P4)
,
while ruling out the difficulty raised
by 'stray evolvers,' rules cut too much. There are cases,
such as the transition from WECA to WEC and the transition
from compositum (1) to compositum (2)
,
that ought to count
as cases of direct evolution. (P4) gives us no way to in-
clude them in those evolving systems of composita to which
they seem, at least intuitively, to belong. Clearly, it is
crucial that one be ^able to exclude stray evolvers from
whatever evolving system of composita one is trying to con-
struct. That is, referring to Figure 4, it is clear that
compositum (la) is stray and ought not have a place in the
system of composita that serve to constitute the ship in
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question. But by exiling (la)
,
Chisholm also exiles com-
positum (2 )
,
since by (P4) it fails to count as a direct
evolver from compositum (1). it seems clear that, however
the relation of direct evolution is defined, it ought to
hold both betv/een composite such as (1) and (2) and between
(1) and, say, (3)
.
In that way, the important distinction
between evolution and direct evolution can be preserved,
while allowing that in cases where there is mere removal of
a part, direct evolution occurs. Otherwise, we will find
ourselves with the troublesome phenomena that manifested
themselves in our consideration of (P4) in conjunction with
Figure 2.
2. The Person and Object Account
Some general changes . Another attempt by Chisholm to
characterize the relation betv/een composite that serve to
constitute the same ship occurs in Person and Object .
Various other changes have been made in his theory by this
time, and we will take note of those that are relevant to
30the present discussion. The things we have been refer-
ring to as 'composita' are now called 'genuine wholes.' In
addition, the concepts of direct evolution and evolution
are replaced by the concepts of direct succession and suc-
cession. This may be, in part, to dispel confusion raised
by the term evolution. By the time of Person and Object ,
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Chisholm has made it clear that one compositum or genuine
whole does not, after changing a part, "turn into" or "be-
come" another one. He advocates a theory, one he calls
mereological essentialism ,
" according to which the parts
of a thing are essential to it. Thus, when a thing loses a
part it goes out of existence. The term "evolution" is
misleading on this score.
The concepts of succession and direct succession
. In order
to do justice to Chisholm's new definitions, yet another
picture is called for:^^
Mon AB
Tue BC
Wed CD
Figure 7.
Figure 7 represents the
history of a very simple table. On Monday it came
into being when a certain thing A was joined with
a certain other thing B. On Tuesday, A was de-
tached from B and C was joined to B, these things
occurring in such a way that a table was to be
found during every moment of the process. And on
Wednesday B was detached from C and D was joined
with C, these things, too, occurring in such a way
that a table was to be found during every moment
of the process. Let us suppose that no other
separating or joining occurred.
So, Chisholm's concern here is to describe the relation be-
tween AB and BC
,
BC and DC, and AB and CD. BC is a 'direct
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table successor of AB, CD is a direct table successor of
BC, and CD is a table successor of AB.' Direct table sue-
cession is defined as follows (my numbering)
:
( D1 ) X is a1; t a direct table successor of y at t' =
df. (i) t does not begin before t'; (ii) x is
a table at t and y is a table at t'; and (iii)
there is a z, such that z is a part of x at t
and is a part of y at t' , and at every moment
between t' and t, inclusive, z is itself a
4- 34table
.
(Dl) tells us that the part z, which both x and y have in
common, is itself a table. This assures us that, through-
out the process of change from y to x, a table will always
be found. (Dl) thus differs from Chisholm's earlier at-
tempts to define direct evolution in that, by insisting
that a table "be found during every moment of the process,"
the problem of stray evolvers that are not themselves
tables is obviated. Thus, the relation of direct succes-
sion holds between composite or genuine wholes that are
tables. It seems, by specifying that the composite in
question are tables, to allow us to pick out just those
composite that are relevant to the determination of same-
ness of table.
The relation of table succession corresponds to the
relation of direct table succession in the same way that
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the relation of evolution corresponds to that of direct
evolution
:
(D2) X is at t a table successor of y at t ' = df.
(i) t does not begin before t'; (ii) x is a
table at t and y is a table at t' and (iii) x
has at t every property P such that (a) y has
P at t' and (b) all direct table successors of
anything having P have P.^^
Chisholm suggests that a "more intuitive" reading of clause
(iii) might be: "x belongs at t to every class C which is
such that (a) y belongs to C at t ' and (b) all direct table
successors of anything belonging to C belong to C."^^
The new concept of constitution
. (Dl) and (D2)
,
in turn,
supply the concepts requisite to the formulation of (D3)
which specifies the conditions under which two composite
constitute the same physical object:
(D3) X constitutes at t the sam.e successive table that
y constitutes at t ' = df. Either (a) x and only
X is at t a table successor of y at t' , or (b) y
and only y is at t’ a table successor of x at t.^"^
Referring to Figure 1
,
(D3) allows us to say that CD con-
stitutes the same successive table as AB
,
since, presumably,
CD is the sole table successor, on Wednesday, of AB. But
let us now scrutinize these definitions more carefully.
The first thing that is noteworthy about (Dl) is
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the fact that there are, at t, a number of direct table
successors, of y at f. Consider the table designated by
the expression "y at f." There are, at f, many parts of
y at t' that are themselves tables. Consider, for instance,
y at t ' minus the left-most edge of y at t', or y at t
'
minus the right-most edge of y at t ' According to Chis-
holm, each of those is itself a table. Suppose that the
table designated by the expression "y at t'" looks like
this ;
KIZ2\
y at t'
Figure 8.
Now, consider the table designated by the expression "x at
f’’:
Now, according to (Dl)
,
the table pictured in Figure 9 is
a direct table successor of y at t' (supposing, of course,
that t does not begin before t')., x at t is a direct table
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successor of y at t' because there is a part of y at t'
that is also a part of x at t which is itself a table
throughout the transition from t’ to t. That part, z, is
represented in Figure 10:
z (at either t or t')
Figure 10.
The persisting part," z, is y at t minus a small piece of
its lower left-hand corner. z is also a part of x at t.
But, we can suppose, there is also a part of z at t', let
us call it w, that is a part of y at t ' and is itself a
table. That part, w, is represented in Figure 11:
w (at t or t
'
)
Figure 11.
The "persisting part," w, is z at t' minus a small part of
its upper left-hand corner. w is also a part of y at t ' .
Thus, X at t itself is a direct table successor of y at t'.
It should be clear that there are many (an infinite num-
ber?) of proper parts of y at t' that will qualify as
106
direct table successors of y at f since those proper parts
will themselves have proper parts that are themselves
tables. {D2)
,
or the 'more intuitive' reading, should by
now be familiar. Since membership in a class is atemporal,
however, and since, presumably, x and y exist at times
other than t and t', clause (iii) of (D2) is better stated
without the temporal parameters given by Chisholm. That
is, clause (iii) should read: "x belongs to every class C
such that (a) y belongs to C and (b) all direct table suc-
cessors of anything belonging to C beloncf to C. "
A problem with the new concept of constitution . Now
,
we
can turn to a discussion of (D3)
. Given (Dl)
,
(D2) is
seriously defective. Recall that according to (Dl), every
proper part of a table that itself has a proper part that
is a table qualifies as a direct table successor of that
table. Thus, at t, there will be many direct table suc-
cessors of y at t ' . It is then not possible that x and y
constitute the same successive table. It will never be the
case either that x and only x is at t a table successor of
y at t', or that y and only y is at t' a table successor
of X at t. (Dl) simply yields too many tables. Though
(Dl) 's extraneous tables are different from those we en-
countered in our discussion of (P1)-(P3), they nevertheless
serve as testimony that Chisholm has not yet characterized
adequately the relation that holds between two composita or
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genuine wholes that constitute the same physical object.
But we can, perhaps, isolate the source of the difficulty
created by (Dl)
.
In proposing (Dl)
,
Chisholm is making the bizarre
assumption that "within" every table, there are many others
which are proper parts of that table. In describing (Dl)
,
Chisholm says.
Thus z is a table which is a proper part of a
table. (If v;e cut off a small part of a table,
we may still have a table left. But if the thing
that is left is a table, then, since it was there
before, it was then a table that was a proper
part of a table.) 38
Thus, though I ordinarily suppose that when I sit where I'm
sitting now, I'm sitting at just one table, on the present
view, I'm actually sitting at many tables. There are,
then, many more tables in this room now than might be sup-
posed. The supposition that there are within every table
many others does, as we have seen, block the difficulties
we encountered with respect to Chisholm's earlier attempts
to define table succession (or evolution). There, no such
supposition was made. But we have simply traded extraneous
evolvers for extraneous tables. If supposing that within
every table there are lots of other tables provided a means
for explaining the relation in question, then we might be
willing to accept its unfortunate metaphysical consequences.
Since it doesn't, there is no reason to compromise our be-
liefs concerning the number of tables (namely, one) at
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v/hich I am now sitting.
which it might v;ork but doesn't
. It might be,
however, that (Dl) works for that limited range of cases
in which tables do have proper parts that are themselves
tables. Take, for instance, the very long banquet table at
which President Carter entertains visiting dignitaries.
There is a decomposition of that table into smaller
tables either because the banquet table is made by fasten-
ing together other, smaller tables, or because one could
'cut up' the banquet table into smaller tables. Let's
suppose it looks like this:
Figure 12.
y at t
'
When dinner is over, those in charge of tables at the White
House disassemble y. is taken to the East Room, where,
at t, it is joined with w to create a new table x^.
at t
• Figure 13
.
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The new table, is a direct table successor of y at t
'
since y at t and at t have in conm^on a part, z^, that
is itself a table and was a table throughout its trip from
the Dining Room to the East Room. We can further suppose
that and y constitute the same successive table since
at t and only x^ is a (direct) table successor of y at
t . So, Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the kind of case for
which we need not make any untoward ontological assumptions
W6 have no trouble granting that z^ is a table that is a
proper part of a table. Nevertheless, even in such cases,
(Dl) together with (D2) and (D3) do not yield reasonable
results. We can depict the difficulty by means of Figure
14 and Figure 15.
Figure 14.
Figure 14, we can suppose, illustrates that table which was
also created by the men in charge of tables at the White
House after the disctssembly of y. Another part of y,
namely z^, was joined together with v to create X
2
at t.
z^ was a table throughout the process.
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Figure 15.
Figure 15 illustrates a similar situation. is the third
table created by the men in charge of tables at the White
House. It was made by joining yet another part of y,
namely with u to create the table x^. Now, we have at
t three direct table successors to y at t'. And since we
have three such direct table successors, we cannot say of
any of them that it constitutes the same successive table
as y at t '
.
The new solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus . It
should be recalled that Chisholm, in explaining the main
points of his theory of persistence, claims that expres-
sions such as "is the same ship as" are defeasible, and
that judgments concerning the identity of physical objects
through time are a matter of convention. In Person and
Object
,
he states his case this way.
If, from the point of view of our practical con-
cerns
,
the new thing that comes into being upon
the addition of parts is sufficiently similar to
the old one, then it is more convenient for us to
treat them as one than it is to take account of
the fact that they are diverse. This point could
also be put by saying that such things as the Ship
of Theseus and indeed most familiar physical things
I
11.1
are leally fictions,' or as we would say todaylogical constructions 39
Chisholm presents his theory, it seems, as a solu-
tion to problems like that of the Ship of Theseus. Though
judgments concerning the identity of ships are, according
to that theory, conventional, it should be clear that on
Chisholm's view, our conventions favor one ship over the
other. At least, Chisholm's conventions favor one ship
over the other. The definitions with which we have been
dealing attempt to capture the relationship between those
various composita that are themselves ships, or that are
linked by composita that are linked by composita that are
themselves ships. Adjusting the language of Person and Ob-
j ect to our present discussion, Chisholm is trying to iso-
late those cases of succession (or evolution) wherein we
find "a ship during every moment of the process." Clearly,
then, it is Chisholm's view that our ship conventions would
yield the result that the ship that was crowned with gar-
lands in 399 B.C. (the ship of the replaced planks) is the
same ship (constitutes the same ship) as the ship Theseus
sailed to Crete. The ship of the Hobbesian man (the re-
assembled ship) is not the same ship as the ship Theseus
sailed to Crete, since we do not, in that case, find a ship
during every moment of the process. Presumably, were our
interests different, had we different 'practical concerns,'
our conventions concerning the identity of ships might
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yield the result that the ship of the Hobbesian man is the
same ship as the ship Theseus sailed to Crete. if that
were so, then we would need a different account of what it
IS for one compositum to constitute the same ship as
another. But Chisholm is assuming, and perhaps he is right,
that, with respect to the problem of the Ship of Theseus,
our sympathies lie with the ship crowned with garlands in
399 B.C. We are more likely to accord the status of iden-
tity (albeit loose and popular) to ships that are linked
together by intermediate ships. Doing so upholds, though
rather weakly, our notion that a gradual replacement of
parts is consistent with the preservation of identity. In
any case, both (P3) and (D3) come out in favor of the ship
of the replaced planks.
The fission problem
. It should be clear, however, that the
problem of the Ship of Theseus is not a case of straight-
forward fission. Straightforward fission cases are repre-
sented by Figure 3, and again in Figures 13, 14, and 15.
With respect to Figure 3, Chisholm tells us that, in such a
case, where we have two absolutely parallel evolving sys-
tems of composite; one that starts with A and goes off to
the right, and one that starts with A and goes off to the
left, the question whether the ship on the left or the ship
on the right is the same as the ship originally launched
can be settled by agreeing upon a set of conventions (pro-
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vided there is agreement with respect to the points (1)
through (7)). Given (P3), and supposing that we have
found (PI) to be without fault, we would have two composita
E and F, each with an equal claim to constituting the same
ship as the compositum A, Recall that (P3) was based on
the idea that one compositum constitutes the same ship as
another when everything that evolved from the first and
into the second was itself a ship. Both E and F are
linked to A, we can suppose, in this way, so each of them
can be said to constitute the same ship as A. Chisholm's
claims about convention should be seen as suggesting that,
in such cases we let concerns of a practical, or perhaps
legal, nature decide between the two. It is presumably
possible that in certain bizarre cases, we might allow
that both E and F constitute the same ship as A. But may-
be our conventions concerning loose and popular identity
cannot stray so far from the strict aiid philosophical.
An assessment of the Person and Object account . The defi-
nitions presented in Person and Object
,
however, run into
problems when we consider cases of fission (or, for that
matter, fusion). Though they make an attempt to deal with
the stray evolvers we encountered in the earlier versions,
in doing so they lose sight of some of the problems with
which the theory was designed to deal. We saw, by means of
Figures 12 through 15, that at least on one interpretation
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(D3) does not even allow for the possibility of fission.
One of the merits of a theory of loose and popular identity
is its potential to account for such cases. If it doesn't
do so successfully, it is hard to see what would move us
to adopt it.
It should further be recalled that, as yet, Chis-
holm has been unable to characterize successfully the
fundamental relations presupposed by his theory, even for
the unproblematic cases. This might be an indication that
further work needs to be done, or that those fundamental
relations are not there to be found. Without them, a
theory that looks good in theory, does not look so good in
practice
.
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CHAPTER I V
THE ORDINARY VIEW
1« A Defense of the Ordinary View
The motivation for returning to the ordinary view
. The
theory that we attributed to Locke and the theory proposed
by Chisholm have, as we have seen, various features in com
mon
. In order to solve the problems that appear inherent
to the ordinary view that physical objects strictly per-
sist through changes in their parts, each of them denies
that strict identity holds between physical objects exist-
ing at different times and substitutes for strict identity
other relations that hold, not between physical objects as
we ordinarily think of them but rather between entities re
puted to be of a more fundamental sort. Chisholm calls
these entities "composita" or "genuine wholes" and claims
that physical objects are logical constructions upon genu-
ine wholes. Locke calls these entities "masses of m.atter"
and claims, though certainly not explicitly, that physical
objects are sets whose members are masses of matter. The
idea that strict identity does not hold betv;een physical
objects existing at different times thus seems to go hand
in hand with the idea that physical objects are not quite
what we ordinarily imagine them to be.
118
119
Each of the theories that we have discussed re-
quires substantial changes in our ontological presupposi-
tions and neither theory is satisfactory in detail. Per-
haps, then, greater attention should be given to the ordin-
ary view that each attempts to replace. We have not, as
yet, encountered any argument against the ordinary view
that is entirely persuasive. That, coupled with the diffi-
culty of presenting a plausible alternative, enhances the
attraction of ordinary view. It is, after all, the one we
seem, in the ordinary course of things, to hold. So, at-
tempt will be made here to formulate the ordinary view in
a reasonably careful way. It can then be shown what sorts
of serious challenges it faces.
Physical objects . Though the Ordinary View was discussed
in Chapter I, it is worth reviewing the ways we normally
think things to be. We think, for instance, that there are
physical objects. Physical objects count among their num-
ber cars, ships, tables, planks, shoes and the like. Some
people think that cows and sheep are physical objects, that
perhaps even persons are physical objects. Others think
that only the bodies of persons, and only the bodies of
sheep and cows are physical objects. Some physical objects
are organic; some are inorganic. Some physical objects are
artifacts, or products of man. Some are natural, or pro-
ducts of nature.
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Physical objects have properties. My car has the
properties of being brown, having a four-cylinder engine,
having a half- full tank, having been shipped from Sweden,
and many others. It gains and loses properties. Yesterday
it had a full tank but today it has only a half-full tank.
Last week it was clean. This week it is dirty.
Physical objects are thought to be made up of other
physical objects which serve as their parts. Not every
collection of physical objects is itself a physical object.
My car is made up of an engine, a body, bumpers, tires,
seats and so forth. But not every collection of tires,
seats, an engine and so forth is a car. A physical object
can gain and lose parts. My car had one muffler, which
rusted out. Now, it has a new one. My car had an antenna,
until someone in Boston took it off. If l moved to Cali-
fornia, I would have to put an emission control system in
my car. Now, it doesn't have one. These changes do not,
we want to say, threaten the persistence of my car.
There is another sort of change which does not seem
to threaten the persistence of a physical object. That is
the change involved in disassembly and subsequent reas-
sembly. My grandmother's marble-topped table was disas-
sembled last year and the relevant parts (the legs, the
marble top, the wooden top upon which the marble top rests)
were put in a crate for shipping. When the crate arrived.
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these pieces were reassembled. My grandmother's table is
now in the bedroom upstairs.
The Ship of Jllieseus: the story told again
. Why, then, do
we have to v/orry about the persistence of physical objects
through changes in their parts? Why does the problem of
the Ship of Theseus challenge our assumption that they do
so persist? Doesn't the Ordinary View have an answer to
the problem? Let us reexamine the situation.
There is a ship in the harbor, the ship that
Theseus sailed to Crete. A plank is removed, then replaced
by another. We have, according to the Ordinary View, no
reason to doubt that the very same object remains after the
change as was there before it. Another plank is removed
and then replaced. Again, we have no problem. Finally, in
399 B.C.
,
after numerous similar changes, the ship is
crowned with garlands. The ship crowned with garlands is
composed of an entirely different set of planks from the
ship that Theseus sailed to Crete, but that causes no prob-
lem for the Ordinary View. Since the identity of the ship
was preserved throughout each intermediate change, it was
preserved overall. This situation is no different from the
many that we confront every day.
But, according to the story, we should not be so
confident in our judgments. Another ship, it seems, has an
equal claim, namely the ship of the Hobbesian man. That
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ship, with which we are by now all too familiar, appears
also in 399 B.C., composed entirely of the original planks.
So we have, in 399 B.C., a ship composed of new planks, and
a ship composed of the original planks. Why does the ship
of the Hobbesian man have an equal claim to identity with
the ship Theseus sailed to Crete? The situation here, it
is supposed, is analogous to that of my grandmother's table.
We have, with respect to the ship, a case of disassembly
and reassembly. If my grandmother's table can survive dis-
assembly, then why can't Theseus' ship? And if it can,
then, clearly, we were overly hasty in our initial judg-
ment .
We have here a case of conflicting principles. In
our discussion of physical objects, it was claimed both
that physical objects can survive the replacement, the
gradual loss and gain of parts and that physical objects
can survive disassembly and reassembly. If we are right,
however, then, with respect to Theseus' ship, we have too
many survivors. Does that mean that we were wrong about
the survival capabilities of physical objects?
My grandmother's table: a new story. Let's look again at
my grandiTiother ' s table. Suppose that on April 13, 1978,
her table is sitting in her livingroom. The m.oving men
take it apart and put the pieces in a packing box. On
April 20, the box arrives in Amherst and the pieces are put
I
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back together. During the intervening week, my grand-
mother's table did not exist, though the pieces that had
been its parts did. My grandmother's table came back into
existence (was reintroduced) on April 20. At some point
during the process of disassembly, the point at which there
ceased to be a table, my grandmother's table v;ent out of
existence. At some point during the reassembly, the point
at which there began to be a table, my grandmother's table
came back into existence. V7e could speculate, if we wished
about what points they were (or, more likely, what point
that was)
. Had it been the case that the pieces in the
packing box were never reassembled, but were used, say, in
the construction of various things, then we would say that
my grandmother's table went out of existence on April 13,
1978, never to return again. So, physical objects don't
survive disassembly. Rather, a physical object can be dis-
assembled and then later reassembled. That is, there can
be gaps in the existence of a physical object.
Assembling and disassembling
. We might say that the gaps
in the existence of physical objects provide us with a way
to distinguish what we might call complete disassembly from
partial disassembly. A table comes to be completely dis-
assembled when we can say of the things that compose it
that none of them any longer composes a table and that
nothing now composes the table. A table comes to be parti-
124
ally disasscTiibled when some parts have been removed without
being replaced but we would say of the remaining parts that
they still compose a table. Complete disassembly, then,
produces either the end of, or simply a gap in, a table's
existence. Partial disassembly, on the other hand, does
not
.
Partial disassembly is, however, another way of
describing that situation we encounter initially with
Theseus' ship. when the first plank is removed, the ship
IS partially disassembled. The plank that was discarded
was part of, but is no longer part of, Theseus' ship. The
same holds true, we can say, of each of the other planks as
It IS discarded. The planks differ, however, in an impor-
tant respect from the pieces of my grandmother's table.
Though the pieces of my grandmother's table are removed in
the process of disassembly, and are thus no longer parts of
my grandmother's table, they cease to be parts of my grand-
mother's table because her table, unlike Theseus' ship, no
longer exists. Thus, the ship of the Hobbesian man appears
to be like my grandmother's table only when we ignore what
is going on elsewhere.
We should not, however, ignore what is going on
elsewhere. If we suppose, as the ordinary view would have
us do, that partial disassembly does not destroy identity,
then the ship that Theseus sailed, to Crete persists at
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least until the time that it is crowned with garlands in
399 B.C. (Our story simply stops there.) The fact that
the Hobbesian man constructs a ship out of the planks that
first composed the Ship of Theseus should not shake our
commitment to the already established identity. Once we
have seen that the ship of the Hobbesian man bears only a
surface resemblance to my grandmother's table, its status
as a serious competitor disappears. The fact that it ap-
peared as a serious competitor is easy enough to under-
stand. One reason, the reason v/e have already explored, is
that there are cases of disassembly and reassembly where
identity is preserved. The other is what might be termed
an epistemological reason. Chisholm tells the story of the
Ship of Theseus in such a way that the planks of the ori-
ginal ship are replaced with aluminum ones. Thus, in 399
B.C. (supposing that there was aluminum in 399 B.C.) we
have two ships, one composed of aluminum and the other of
wood. Now, if someone were shewn a picture of the origin-
al ship, a picture of the aluminum ship and a picture of
the ship of the Hobbesian man, and were asked "Which of
these ships do you think is identical to v;hich?", it is
quite likely that he would reply, "Well, it must be that
this one (pointing to the original ship) and that one
(pointing to the ship of the Hobbesian man) are identical."
After all, without any further information, a person would
be disinclined to think that an aluminum ship could be the
very same as a wooden one.
Coburn on
__tabj^. Robert Coburn^ gives a similar sort of
case, one we can call The Problem of the Table of Aunt Mabel
:
If we say that the table which is in the hall-way on Christmas day of 1943 is the same table asthe one which was there on Christmas day of 1970,despite a long series of gradual changes, then, if
we are asserting a relation of strict identity, wemay find ourselves having to say, for example, thatbecause the table that was in the hallway on Christ-
mas day 1943 was given to me by my Aunt Mabel, the
hallway on Christmas day1^70 was given to me by my Aunt Mabel--even thoughthe table in the hallway on Christmas day in 1943
was a large, wooden table with beautifully carveddesigns and the table which was in the hallway onChristmas day 1970 was a very small table with dent-
ed and rusty tubes for legs and a cheap plastic top
with a hideous flov;er design imprinted upon it.^
Coburn is disturbed by The Problem of the Table of
Aunt Mabel just because it seems to undermine our intui-
tions about persistence through gradual change. Again, if
someone were shown a picture of Aunt Mabel's table in 1943
and a picture of it in 1970, he might register disbelief
about their identity. In at least one respect, this is
somewhat peculiar. Consider the case of persons or, de-
pending upon your philosophical persuasions, the case of
human bodies. Surely, if anything persists through gradual
change, human bodies do. The bodies of small infants, and
the bodies of 50 year old men are considerably different.
The fact that we feel no uneasiness when shown a picture by
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a grown up friend who says "This is me when I was a baby"
seems to be a result of our expectations concerning the or-
dinary development of human beings. We expect people (or
their bodies) to grow, to wrinkle, to get hairier in some
places, and less hairy in others, to get flabby, and so on.
Dramatic, though gradual, changes in tables are not, it
seems, quite so common. But pointing to the aluminum-
legged, plastic-topped table in the hallway in 1970 and say-
ing "That was once a beautiful table," or pointing to the
aluminum-planked ship, crowned with garlands, and saying
"That was once sailed by Theseus to Crete" is no different,
fundamentally, from pointing to a 50 year old man (or to
his body) and saying "That once weighed eight pounds." The
difference may come down to something like this: with re-
spect to the changes that occur in normal human bodies,
there is always someone, the same someone, who has, as it
were, witnessed the changes and so can testify to having
persisted throughout them. Ordinary physical objects (if
persons are physical objects, they are at least not ordinary
physical objects) do not have that advantage. Sometimes,
in fact, there is simply no one around at all.
The odd consequences of the Ordinary View do not
appear deeply troublesome. Surely, they are not alone suf-
ficient to persuade us that our judgment concerning the
identity of the various ships is faulty. The ship of the
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Hobbesian man simply does not have enough in its favor.
Sameness of planks (or any other decomposition) is not suf-
ficient, as we saw in Chapter I, for identity. The fact
that the planks that compose it are those that first com-
posed Theseus* ship mean that it has an intimate tie with
that ship. Many people might be more interested in looking
at it than they are in looking at the ship that is in fact
identical to Theseus' ship. its planks, after all, were
touched by Theseus while the planks of Theseus' ship,
ironically enough, were not.
2. A Formulation of the Ordinary View
Plantinga on the need for a mean between the extremes . The
Ordinary View, then, in addition to presuming that physical
objects are real, presupposes that there is a mean between
two extremes of mereological essentialism and what Chis-
holm calls "complete, unbridled mereological inessential-
3ism." Mereological essentialism, as we have seen, is the
view that the parts of a thing are essential to it, and
that if y is ever a part of x, y will be a part of x as
long as x exists.^ Mereological inessentialism, in its
complete, unbridled form, is the view that for any whole w,
w could be made up of any two things whatsoever. Surely,
the latter view is as absurd as Chisholm makes it out to
be. His example, of this table here before me being made
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up of my left foot and the Grand Central Station illus-
trates the point. In the face of such odds, mereological
essentialism seems an attractive alternative. Plantinga
characterizes the situation this way:
But if MC [the Principle of Mereological Change-lessness] is thus intuitively plausible, what isthe source of its attractiveness? Perhaps itsgenerality and simplicity, coupled with the factthat there are some mereological changes an objectdoes not survive. If l replace a tire on my auto-
mobile, we think the same automobile persists
through the change, acquiring a new part. But if
I replace the automobile on my tire, the whole that
contains my tire is not the whole I began v/ith.
And of course there are many changes where it isintuitively unclear whether we have to do with a
mereological alteration on the part of an enduring
object, or the substitution of one object for an-
other . °
Chisholm, himself, of course, opts for mereological
essentialism. The difficulties he thereby avoids (namely
those inherent in any attempt to find a mean between the
extremes) are matched, we have seen, by those he encounters
in defending mereological essentialism. Plantinga, on the
other hand, considers Chisholm's route to be extreme. "It
seems . . . obvious that many objects—human bodies, for
example--persist through small mereological changes: for
example, haircuts. One would need a pov/erful argument, I
7think, to conclude otherwise."
Small mereological changes . The question is: just what
sort of changes are "small mereological changes"? The re-
placement of a plank on a ship is a reasonably small change;
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the replacement of a ship on a plank is a large change. in
characterizing the Ordinary view, we distinguished, albeit
loosely, between partial and complete disassembly. Through
partial disassembly an object retains its identity; through
complete disassembly, it does not. In discussing these
concepts, an appeal was made to the notion of a point in
the process of disassembly at which there ceased to be a
table. There was a table and there is now a m.ere collec-
tion of table parts. Such a change is the sort some
philosophers call a "substantial change." One problem, of
course, is that the loss of tablehood does not seem to be
connected to the removal of any particular part. Tablehood
does not reside in some part such that the removal of that
part always accounts for the loss of tablehood. Since it
doesn't, we must be able to locate the loss of tablehood
somewhere else. But where might that be? Let us, however,
return to ships in attempting to answer the more general
question what sorts of changes are identity-preserving
changes?
Physical object properties . Recall that physical objects
are things such as tables, ships, cats and bicycles. It
seems reasonable to suppose, then, that the things that are
physical objects have properties such as being a table,
being a ship, and so on. Let us call those Physical Object
Properties. The Ordinary Viev/, I think, would hold that
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for any physical objects x and y, if x is a ship at t and
X at t = y at t', then y is a ship at t ' . In a more gen-
eral form:
(PI) D (x) (y) (x at t = y at t' -> (P) (p is a physical
object property
-> x has P at t and y has P at t')).
One way of trying to answer our question is to try to
formulate more precisely the concepts to which we appealed
in presenting the Ordinary View's view concerning Theseus'
ship. We want to be able to say that changes involving
partial disassembly are identity preserving while changes
involving complete disassembly aren't. If v/e take off
some minimal part of a ship, say, a plank, the same ship
persists. But if we dismantle a ship, take it apart or
remove too many parts, it doesn't. One problem that we
confront is the appropriate characterization of 'minimal
part. Recall that, in Chapter I, when an attempt was made
to formulate the notion of a gradual change, we ran into a
similar problem. There, we appealed to the concept of re-
semblance. A change is gradual if the replacement part
resembles the replaced part. But the change that occurs
when we supposed that Jason replaced all but one oarlock of
his ship with Theseu's' ship minus one oarlock turns out,
then, to be gradual. But we wouldn't want to say that the
ship Jason now has is identical to the ship he had before
the change. The part he is replacing, it seems, is too big.
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Pnysical ob j ects
-j^vai;^g
. in order to circumvent dif-
ficulties such as these, we can invoke the concept of a
phyoical object-in-waiting
. We actually encountered
these things in our discussion of Chisholm's definition of
direct table succession. Chisholm there presupposed that
tables have proper parts that are themselves tables.
Rather than agreeing to that, we can say that every table
has various tables-in-waiting relative to it. A table-in-
waiting is a set of table parts. A ship-in-waiting is a
set of ship parts. But these sets have certain distin-
guishing characteristics.
(P2) K is a physical object-in-waiti.ng relative to
X at t =df
.
(3D) { (D is a decomposition of x
at t and K C D) and Ow) [ (w is a possible world
and K is a decomposition of x in w) and (P) (p
is a Physical Object Property and x has P at
t X has P in w) ] }
.
Take the ship Hansel that is composed of various parts
(under some decomposition) a, b, c on Monday. The set
{a,b} is a subset of the set {a,b,c}. The set {a,b} is a
ship-in-waiting relative to Hansel on Monday just in case
there ' s a possible world in which {a,b} is a decomposition
of Hansel. Speaking loosely, we can say that, on Monday,
Hansel has a part p such that if someone were to remove
another part p', p would then be a ship. In fact, speaking
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loosely, p would be Hansel. Ships can survive the loss of
parts such as p' because they have parts such as p that
carry them through the change. Jason's ship undergoes such
a change, though it is described in a somewhat misleading
fashion. Jason's ship has a ship-in-waiting relative to
it, namely, the set whose members are the parts of Jason's
ship (under some decomposition) minus one oarlock. When
the oarlock is removed on Tuesday that set becomes a de-
composition of Jason's ship. it is simply a typical case
of a ship losing a part and surviving that loss. We can
characterize such a loss in this way:
(P3) X loses a part at t iff (3K) (K is a physical
object-in-waiting relative to x at t ' < t and
K is a decomposition of x at t)
.
Take again the ship Hansel. On Tuesday, Hansel is composed
of two parts a and b. If a part c is added to Hansel on
Wednesday, then on Wednesday, the set {a,b,c} is a de-
composition of Hansel. The set {a,b} then becomes a ship-
in-waiting relative to Hansel. Speaking loosely, we can
say that when an object gains a part and survives the gain
it is transformed into an object-in-waiting. When the oar-
lock is removed from Jason's ship and put on Theseus' ship,
the set whose members are the parts of Theseus ' ship minus
its oarlock ceases to be a decomposition of Theseus ' ship
and instead becomes a ship-in-waiting relative to Theseus'
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ship. We can characterize identity preserving gain of a
part this way:
(P4) X gains a part at t iff (3K) (K is a decomposition
of X at t' < t and K is a physical object-in-
waiting relative to x at t)
.
^sembling and disassembling: some definitions
. Earlier we
said that physical objects can survive partial disassembly
but cannot survive complete disassembly. Having been com-
pletely disassembled, however, an object can be reassembled.
Partial disassembly is simply the loss of a part.
(P5) X is partially disassembled at t iff x loses a
part at t.
Complete disassembly occurs, on the other hand, when an
object is taken apart in such a way that though its parts
may remain, it doesn't. We might say that a ship can be
partially disassembled up until that point when it has no
more ships-in-waiting relative to it. Though there are
ship parts remaining, none of them has a decomposition that
is a ship-in-waiting relative to the ship that is being
disassembled. After that point, the ship has come to be
completely disassembled.
(P6) X is completely disassembled at t iff (3 d) { (D is
a decomposition of x at t' < t) and (y) [ (y G D
and y exists at t) “> ~ (3K) (K is a decomposition of
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y and K was a physical object-in-waiting rela-
tive to X at t
' )
]
} .
Finally, an object comes to be partially reassembled when
it has the same Physical Object Properties it had before
disassembly and when its decomposition is that of one of
its earlier physical objects-in-waiting.
(P7) X is partially reassembled at t iff (at') [(t' < t
and X was completely disassembled at t') and (3K)
(K was a physical object-in-waiting relative to x
at t' and K is a decomposition of x at t) and (P)
(P is a Physical Object Property and x had P at t'
-:>x has P at t) ] .
An object is completely reassembled when its decomposition
IS the same as its decomposition before disassembly and it
shares with its former self all Physical Object Properties.
(P8) X is completely reassembled at t iff (3t') [(t' <
t and X was completely disassembled at t') and
(3D) (D was a decomposition of x at t' and D is
a decomposition of x at t) and (P) (P is a Physi-
cal Object Property and x had P at t ' x has P
at t) ]
.
My grandm.other ' s table, then, was completely dis-
assembled for shipping. Theseus' ship, on the other hand,
never was. Each time a plank was removed, it lost a part.
And each time a new plank was added, it gained a part. But
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^
It survived each of those changes. since the ship that
gained and lost parts persisted throughout those changes,
I
then the ship of the Hobbesian man, though it shares a
I
decomposition with Theseus' ship on its first day of exis-
,
tGncG, cannot bG thG samG ship.
I
I
I
ThG fission problGm ag aj^. Though thG concGpt of a physi-
cal objGct-in-waiting may help us in attempting to charac-
terize the metaphysical principles underlying the Ordinary
View's view of the problem of the Ship of Theseus, it may
be thought inadequate in another, related area. The prob-
I
lem of the Ship of Theseus appears initially to be a prob-
,
lem of fission. We start, as it were, with one thing and
j
I
end with tv;o. The concept of a physical object-in-waiting
is helpful largely because it helps to explain just how one
I
of those two things can be eliminated. That is, it helps
us to explain that, in fact, the problem of the Ship of
j
Theseus is not a problem of fission after all. Indeed, it
{
may not be. But could there not be cases of genuine fis-
sion?'’
!
I
According to the Ordinary View, a physical object
j
can gain and lose parts and persist through those changes.
A physical object doesn't persist through complete dis-
assembly, though it can be reassembled. Fission seems to
lie somewhere in between. Suppose that we have a ship
Fritz that is composed on Monday of tv;o principal parts x
4
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and y (that is, there is a decomposition of Fritz on Mon
day into x and y) . The ship looks like this:
Fritz on Monday
Figure 1.
On Tuesday, Fritz, as Chisholm likes to describe such
phenomena, goes off in two different directions.
Fritz on Monday
Hansel and Gretel
on Tuesday
Figure 2.
Both X and y seemed to be, on Monday, ships-in-waiting
relative to Fritz. That is, x and y can each be said to
be "shippy" enough that Fritz might be composed just of x
in some world or of y in some world. When Fritz goes off
in two different directions on Tuesday, we call the result-
ing objects "Hansel" (the part x) and "Gretel" (the part
y) . Hansel and Gretel are equal in all relevant respects:
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they a.e the same size, have the same shippy properties,
and so on. The question is, of course, whether either
Hansel or Gretel is identical to Fritz. Has Fritz per-
sisted, or has Fritz disappeared?
It should be clear that not both Hansel and Gretel
can be identical to Fritz. So, let us consider Hansel. If
Hansel is identical to Fritz, then we should describe the
situation as Fritz losing a part, namely y. Thus, Fritz
was composed of x and y on Monday and is composed just of x
on luesday. Unfortunately, however, the same reasoning
applies with respect to Gretel. On Monday, Fritz was com-
posed of X and y and Tuesday Fritz is composed just of y.
Since Hansel and Gretel are equal in all relevant respects,
there seems to be nothing we might bring to bear in decid-
j
ing between the two.
Neither, however, can we say that Fritz was com-
pletely disassembled on Tuesday. Complete disassembly re-
quires that speaking loosely, none of the remaining parts
was a ship-in-waiting relative to Fritz before disassembly.
But we have already granted that each of them is. So, it
seems that Fritz has not disappeared. What, then, can a
proponent of the Ordinary View say about this sort of case?
The Ordinary View's solution to the fission problem . Re-
;
call that, at the end of Chapter I, we discussed Chisholm's
j
reasons for claiming that there is a disanalogy between
I
i
!i
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personal identity and physical object identity. The dis-
analogy lies in the reputed fact that, with respect to
physical object fission cases, we can imagine that the
matter could be settled by appealing to a high authority
whereas no such appeal would help in person fission cases.
The fact that a high authority could settle the matter with
ships shows that ships do not strictly persist through
changes. Since the high authority's decision could go
either way
,
it must be that strict identity is not at is-
sue. Ships persist, then, only in a loose and popular
sense
.
Fritz and Hansel and Gretel present us with just
the sort of case that warrants, according to Chisholm, an
appeal to authority. The captain of Fritz needs to know
which ship. Hansel or Gretel, he is to command. The usual
means do not yield a result. We can imagine, as we did in
Chapter I, that this is just the moment at vjhich the Cap-
tain of Fritz would be justified in going to the authori-
ties in charge of ships. Suppose that the authorities de-
cide in favor of Hansel. They must decide, it seems, on
reasonably arbitrary grounds, since Hansel and Gretel are
alike in all relevant respects. Perhaps the authorities
would flip a coin, perhaps they would decide that they pre-
fer Hansel's present spot in the harbor. The Captain, in
any event, would be off the hook. It seems possible, how-
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ever, that the authorities might be wrong about which ship
is, in fact, identical to Fritz. But that doesn't matter.
The ownership or captainship claims that are made with
respect to ships are, if anything is, conventional. So,
conventional "identity" serves our purposes in such a case.
The captain need not worry further, unless he has inclina-
tions of the philosophical sort, which one is really iden-
tical.
Such a case appears no different from the person
fission case that Chisholm offers. About that case he
says
,
There may be no sufficient reason at all for de-
ciding that you are or you are not one or the other
of the two different persons. But from this itdoes not follow that you will not in fact be one
or the other of the two persons.
The lack of a criterion for deciding between the two does
not sway his conviction that personal identity is strict
identity. We can, I think, stand just as firm with respect
to physical object identity. The lack of a criterion only
shov;s that there are some cases about which we cannot be
certain. It does not show, any more than it does for per-
sonal identity, that we must abandon strict identity alto-
gether. We need only abandon it in a very limited sense:
cases of genuine fission may call for a judgment. That
judgment will presumably be based on considerations of con-
vention. Since that is so, we may find ourselves calling
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Hansel the same ship as Fritz when, in
the same. That demonstrates the
can, in the ordinary course of things,
sophical certainty. To make more of it
of it
.
fact, it isn't
extent to which we
do without philo--
is to make too much
^ Assessment of the Ordinary View
AJ^in^that there
_i s trouble
. The preceding account of the
Ordinary View has its merits. It provides a fuller account
of the principles to v/hich we appealed in Chapter I and it
further provides a means for understanding more fully the
relationship betv;een the metaphysical and epistemological
issues raised by the problem of persistence. On closer
examination, however, it can be seen to rest on very shaky
ground. Lying beneath it is a confusion that calls into
question the consistency of our ordinary beliefs concerning
the persistence conditions of physical objects. It should
be obvious that, in presenting our account of the Ordinary
View, no attempt was made to elucidate the notion of a
Physical Object Property. The viability of the theory re-
quires such an elucidation. To attempt to do so, however,
is to reveal the nature of the confusion just alluded to.
Physical object properties again: are they essential prop-
erties? When the concept of a Physical Object Property was
first introduced, a principle concerning such properties
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was suggested. That principle (PI)
,
entails that Physical
Object Properties are omnitemporal. That is, for any
Physical Object Property F, if x has F at t, then x has F
at any time at which x exists. The property of being a
table would seem to be a prime candidate for a Physical Ob-
ject Property. If x is a table at t, and x exists at t' 7^
t, then X is a table at f. We know, then, that if a thing
X is a table at t and a thing y is not a table at t' t,
then X and y are not identical.
The obvious question that arises at this point is
whether Physical Object Properties are essential to che
things that have them. That is, for any Physical Object
Property F, is it true that if x has F, then x has F in
any v;orld in which x exists? Might something that is a
table in this world be a cat in some other world (suppos-
ing, of course, that being a cat is a Physical Object
Property)? More precisely, might something that is a table
in this world, exist in some other world and yet fail to be
a table in that world? We would be inclined, it seems, to
think not. If Physical Object Properties are essential,
however, we are faced with a serious difficulty. Consider
the following table, Maude. Maude exists in this world,
which we v;ill call "here."
Maude here at t
Figure 3.
At some time t, Maude is composed of x and y. That
IS, there is a decomposition D of Maude at t and D = {x,y}.
We might wish to know whether there is a subset of D that
qualifies as a table-in-waiting relative to Maude at t.
The set having y as a member seems a likely prospect. Let
K = {y}. If K is a table-in-waiting relative to Maude at
t, then, according to (P2), K is a decomposition of Maude
in some possible world and in that world Maude has every
Physical Object Property that she has here. (If Physical
Object Properties are essential, then this latter condition
is superfluous.) If K is a decomposition of Maude in some
possible world w, then Maude looks like this in w:
Maude in w
Maude in w is composed of y. That is all there is
to Maude
.
If y is all there is to Maude in w, and Maude is
a table in, w, then y niust be a table in w. But if y is a
table in w, and if Physical Object Properties are essenti-
al, then y is a table here. Here, y is a table that is a
proper part of a table. It is not simply a would-be table,
It IS an actual table. Recall that in introducing the con-
cept of a physical object-in-waiting, we claimed to be
avoiding just such a commitment. We can, of course, deny
that the property of being a table is essential. Then, we
must grant that what is a table in this world fails to be
one in some other world. In some other world, it's a cat.
;^other argument against persistence
. Whether or not
Physical Object Properties are essential, however, our dis-
cussion of that issue touched upon one even more troubling.
Following Maude from here to w, we found that something
that was merely a part of Maude here is no longer a part of
Maude in v;. In w, that part Maude. Our characteriza-
tion (P2) of a physical object-in-waiting hides that fact
behind the veil of decompositions. If y Maude in w, and
if we assume that identity is a relation that holds of
necessity, then y is Maude here. A glance at Figure 3,
however, shows that this is not so. Here, Maude is the
thing composed of x and y. Surely, y is not the thing com-
posed of X and y. So, y isn't Maude here. But, coming
back around, if y isn't Maude here, then y can't be Maude
in w. This line of reasoning is made explicit by (Al)
:
(Al) 1. y = Maude, in w y = Maude, here
2. Maude = the thing composed of x and y, here
3. the thing composed of x and y y, here
4. y Maude, here
5. y 7^ Maude, in w.
Two troubling consequences of the argumen t. If, hov/ever,
Maude and y are not identical in w, we are left with two
problems. The first can be illustrated by a picture that
resembles Figures 3 and 4 in many important respects:
Maude at t Maude at t ' > t
Figure 5.
Figure 5 represents an ordinary case of a table losing a
small part. (P3)
,
which states the conditions under v;hich
something loses a part, was supposed to entail that the
thing in question survives the change. A table loses a
part when a set that was a table-in-waiting relative to it
becomes its own decomposition. It should be clear now that
such a phenomenon occurs only when something that was a
table becomes the table itself. y was a part of Maude at
t. At t'
, y is Maude. (Al) would seem, mutatis mutandis
,
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to apply here as well. if (a 1) applies, then y isn't Maude
after all. But what, then, is Maude? We supposed that
Maude was going to persist through the loss of x, and yet
It seems that she hasn't. Or if she has, it is not at all
easy to see, given that she isn't y, what she is.
The second problem arises in attempting to solve
the first. Suppose that we say that, indeed, y and Maude
are not identical in w. They aren't identical here, so
they aren't identical there (or anywhere else). But if
Maude exists in w and is not identical to y, it is still
true that Maude and y have a great deal in common. They
share, for example, every decomposition. Maude and y have
exactly the same parts. If so, we must affirm the follow-
ing principle:
(P9) O (3x) (3y) (3t) ( D) (D is a decomposition of x
at t E D is a decomposition of y at t and x y) .
(P9) should be distinguished from another principle that we
affirmed in presenting the Ordinary View.
(PIO) O Ox) (3y) (3t) Ot') (3D) (D is a decomposition
of X at t and D is a decomposition of y at t',
t
' 7^ t and X 7^ y ) .
(PIO) was presupposed by our assertion that the ship that
Theseus sailed to Crete and the ship of the Hobbesian man,
though they share a decomposition into planks, are not
identical. (P9) presents a far greater challenge. Accord-
14 7
ing to It, two different things can share all their parts
at one and the same time.
QnejrLQ£g_t^^ consequent. Equally troublesome re-
sults appear with respect to properties. Maude, if she
exists in w, shares many properties with y. Maude is a
table, and so is y. Whatever color Maude is, y is that
color, too. Wherever Maude is, y is also there. In fact,
the only properties that might be called into service to
distinguish Maude from y are various modal properties. If
Maude exists in v;, then Maude has the property of having x
as a part here. y does not have that property. Maude has
the property of having y as a part here, y does not have
that property. But a difference in modal properties alone
is not reassuring. Coupled with the necessity to affirm
(P9)
,
it becomes more attractive to deny that Maude exists
at all in v;. If Maude does not exist in w, then Maude
does not exist at t'. If we deny that Maude exists in w,
then we deny that Maude persists through a change in her
parts
.
A reconsideration o f an argument in Chapter I . Recall that
in Chapter I
,
the problem of the Ship of Theseus was said
to present us with four possibilities. We discussed an
argument (A4) that asserted the falsity of the first three,
and so concluded that the fourth must be true. Our recent
account of the Ordinary view attempts to give credence to
opting for the first, namely, that the ship that was crown-
ed with garlands in 399 B.C. is identical to the original
ship. If our present argument, (Al)
,
is right, then we
must abandon that possibility.
The second possibility, namely that the ship of the
Hobbesian man is identical to the original ship, is subject
to the same difficulties. We have seen that sharing a de-
composition is not sufficient for identity. Now, we have
reason to doubt that the two ships do, in fact, share a
decomposition. The planks, as proposed members of this
shared decomposition, surely fall under the umbrella of
(Al) . Since each of them has gained and lost parts during
the intervening period, we must doubt whether it has itself
persisted. If so, we are loft with the fourth possibility,
namely, that neither later ship is identical to the origin-
al. Of course, the remainder, (A4)
,
where the truth of
the fourth possibility is seen to entail that physical ob-
jects don’t persist through changes in their parts, is ex-
traneous. If we accept the fourth possibility it is be-
cause we have come to realize that physical objects do not
so persist, and not the other way around.
The benefits of the Chisholm/Locke approach . Considera-
tions such as these lend credibility, if not strength, to
the attempts of philosophers such as Locke and Chisholm to
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give an alternative account of persistence. Even the view
that Identity is relative gains a certain attraction, since
a principle such as (P9) would not trouble someone who be-
lieves that what I take to be one thing having lots of
properties is in fact not one thing at all. The table at
which I sit now shares every decomposition with the desk
at which I sit now, though according to the proponent of
relative ioentity
,
the table and the desk are not identi-
cal. The theories presented by Chisholm and Locke, if we
suppose that the latter is not a proponent of relative
identity
,
were based on the assumption that real things
(composita or masses of matter) have their parts essential-
ly. Perhaps we can now see more clearly the advantages of
making that assumption.
Locke and Chisholm fail to escape: a Leibnizian specula-
tion . Neither theory, however, works in detail. It is
not even clear that they succeed in avoiding difficulties
as profound as the ones that appear to plague the Ordinary
View. Chisholm replaces identity with relations like that
of table succession. But one compositum or genuine whole
is a direct table successor to another only if they have a
part in common. That part, then, must either strictly per-
sist or it must itself be a logical construction out of
some more basic things. Chisholm's discussions always in-
volve, or seem to involve, the sort of change represented
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in Figure 5. The table at f would be, if Chisholm's de-
finitions worked, a direct table successor to the table at
t. They have parts in common. Each of those parts, how-
ever, seems to be of the same ontological status as the
table Itself, and so would be subject to the same rules of
persistence (or non-persistence)
. The parts themselves
have parts. We are reminded of Leibniz' assertion that
"whatever has corporeal parts cannot fail to lose some of
them at every moment. if so, then the parts themselves
do not strictly persist. They must then themselves be
logical constructions. But if they are logical construc-
tions, what are they constructed upon? It begins to look
as if we are on our way to a Leibnizian reduction. if
Maude, for instance, does exist in w, or at t', then per-
haps Maude is not a physical object at all.
Where we stand
. Speculations such as these take us far
from the Ordinary View. They even take us far from what
now appear relatively tame alternatives to the Ordinary
Viev7, those of Locke and Chisholm. It should come as no
surprise, however, to find that a solution to the problem
of persistence may lie in such redoubtable territory. We
have >• seen, after all, that the problem is far deeper than
we had originally thought it to be.
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